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Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement  
for U.S. Citizenship† 
KEVIN LAPP* 
This Article explores the impact of the convergence of criminal law and 
immigration law on the most valued government benefit in the land: citizenship. 
Specifically, it examines how criminal history influences the opportunity to 
naturalize through the good moral character requirement for U.S. citizenship.  
Since 1790, naturalization applicants have been required to prove their good 
moral character. Enacted to ensure that applicants were fit for membership and 
would not be disruptive or destructive to the community, the character requirement 
also allowed for the reformation and eventual naturalization of those guilty of past 
misconduct. This Article shows that recent changes in immigration law and the 
handling of naturalization petitions by the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) have turned the good moral character requirement 
into a powerful exclusionary device. Since 1990, Congress has added hundreds of 
permanent, irrebuttable statutory bars to a good moral character finding based on 
criminal conduct. Where no bar applies, examiners may still deny an applicant on 
character grounds in their discretion, which they are doing with management 
encouragement and increasing frequency. The effect is the creation of bars to 
citizenship not found in the statute, subverting the statutory and regulatory scheme 
governing naturalization. 
The expressively punitive nature of the current good moral character provision 
and USCIS’s misguided priorities in handling naturalization applications force 
legal resident immigrants with criminal histories to permanently live in the 
shadows of full membership, never able to possess the full rights, privileges, and 
respect that citizenship can bring. The Article argues that a robust, inclusive notion 
of citizenship remains necessary despite its apparent diminishment in the twenty-
first century world. Informed by insights from sociological research on community 
cohesion and criminological findings on desistance, it shows why there must be 
space for those residents with a criminal past to demonstrate their current fitness 
for membership. It urges statutory and agency reforms that would realign the good 
moral character requirement with its historical purpose and understanding and 
promote a naturalization scheme that, at no cost to public safety, promotes social 
cohesion and advances democracy and equality by making redemptive citizenship 
possible. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requires that all naturalization 
applicants demonstrate their good moral character.1 This requirement has existed 
since Congress passed the first naturalization statute in 1790.2 It aims to ensure the 
applicant’s fitness for full membership in the polity and that she will not be 
disruptive or dangerous to the community.3  
For over 150 years, Congress offered no guidance whatsoever on what 
constituted good moral character in the naturalization context.4 In the absence of a 
statutory definition, courts developed a flexible, forward-looking standard for 
evaluating good moral character that did not mean to punish for past conduct5 but 
instead contemplated prior transgressions and recognized the potential for reform.6 
The immigration service adopted this view, stating in a mid-twentieth-century 
training manual that Congress “undoubtedly intended to provide for the 
reformation of those who have been guilty of past misdeeds.”7  
Recent changes in immigration law and the handling of naturalization petitions 
by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) have turned the good 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a) (2006); 8 C.F.R. §§ 316.2(a)(7), 316.10, 329.2(d) (2010). 
 2. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103. 
 3. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1114 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. 
Jackson) (“I think, before a man is admitted to enjoy the high and inestimable privileges of a 
citizen of America, that something more than a mere residence among us is necessary. I 
think he ought to pass some time in a state of probation, and, at the end of the term, be able 
to bring testimonials of a proper and decent behavior . . . .”). 
 4. See infra Part I.B. 
 5. See, e.g., Posusta v. United States, 285 F.2d 533, 535–36 (2d Cir. 1961) (remarking 
that the standard is not “penal” and that “a person may have a ‘good moral character’ though 
he has been delinquent upon occasion in the past”). 
 6. See infra Part I.B. 
 7. IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY SERVICE, NATIONALITY MANUAL: FOR THE USE OF 
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE § 773 
(1945). 
2012] GOOD MORAL CHARACTER REQUIREMENT 1573 
 
moral character requirement into a powerful exclusionary device. Since 1990, 
Congress has added hundreds of permanent, irrebuttable statutory bars to a good 
moral character finding triggered by criminal conduct.8 Where no statutory bar 
applies, naturalization examiners may still deny an applicant on character grounds 
in their discretion.9 The effect of these statutory changes and agency practices is the 
creation of bars to citizenship not found in the statute, subverting the statutory and 
regulatory scheme governing naturalization.10 
While many scholars have critically explored U.S. naturalization policies, few 
have discussed the good moral character requirement for citizenship at any length. 
Several articles predating the passage of the INA in 195211 and four articles from 
the early 1970s12 discussed the various standards that courts used to determine 
good moral character and the lack of uniformity in the results reached. But the law 
and agency practices have changed significantly since then. Among recent 
scholarship, only Professor Peter Spiro’s 1999 article, Questioning Barriers to 
Naturalization, spends any time explicitly exploring the good moral character 
requirement, and even there the discussion totals only a few paragraphs.13 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. See infra Part I.B.  
 9. See infra Part II.B. Until 1990, exclusive jurisdiction to grant naturalization rested 
with courts. The Immigration Act of 1990 introduced administrative naturalization, vesting 
the Attorney General with exclusive jurisdiction to grant naturalization without permission 
from the district court. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 407(d)(14)(B), 104 
Stat. 4978, 5044. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See generally Winfield E. Ohlson, Moral Character and the Naturalization Act, 13 
B.U. L. REV. 636 (1933); Albert S. Persichetti, Good Moral Character as a Requirement for 
Naturalization, 22 TEMP. L.Q. 182 (1948); Elmer Plischke, “Good Moral Character” in the 
Naturalization Law of the United States, 23 MARQ. L. REV. 117 (1939); Note, Good Moral 
Character in Naturalization Proceedings, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 622 (1948).  
 12. See generally Lisa H. Newton, On Coherence in the Law: A Study of the “Good 
Moral Character” Requirement in the Naturalization Statute, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 40 (1972) 
(asserting that the law cannot be applied coherently or meaningfully and suggesting its 
elimination); Steven L. Strange, Private Consensual Sexual Conduct and the “Good Moral 
Character” Requirement of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 357 (1975) (arguing against including private sexual conduct within the moral character 
inquiry for citizenship purposes); Note, The Evaluation of Good Moral Character in 
Naturalization Proceedings, 38 ALB. L. REV. 895 (1974) (urging a single, national standards 
test); Note, Naturalization and the Adjudication of Good Moral Character: An Exercise in 
Judicial Uncertainty, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 545 (1972) (arguing for the use of objective factors 
and a focus on the applicant’s recent conduct). 
 13. Peter J. Spiro, Questioning Barriers to Naturalization, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 479, 
508–16 (1999) (positing that the good moral character requirement is surplusage when 
considered alongside deportation provisions). Recent works that analyze various 
requirements for naturalization discuss the good moral character requirement cursorily if at 
all. See PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION 
33–59 (2008) (devoting an entire chapter to the various naturalization requirements, such as 
the English language proficiency requirement and the civics exam, but failing to discuss the 
good moral character requirement); Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying U.S. Naturalization 
Policies, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 237 (1994) (mentioning but not discussing the good moral 
character requirement). Neither of the two leading immigration law textbooks, each over 
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This Article analyzes how the good moral character provisions in the INA and 
the current USCIS practices deny naturalization to legal residents with criminal 
history. Part I introduces the concept of citizenship broadly, outlining the important 
and increasing distinction between the status of citizen and that of legal permanent 
resident. It then traces the history of the good moral character requirement for 
naturalization in the United States, contrasting the flexible standard that recognized 
reform applied by courts and encouraged by the agency through the middle of the 
twentieth century with the current, wide-reaching, and permanent statutory bars to a 
good moral character finding for those with criminal convictions and the agency’s 
current penchant for punitive discretion. 
Part II shows how the good moral character requirement affects three groups of 
legal resident immigrants that share one thing in common: they have, at some point 
during their stay in the United States, been arrested for or committed a crime or 
violation of the law. Members of the first group faced formal removal charges but 
were granted relief under immigration law by an immigration judge and were 
welcomed to stay permanently in the United States. Such relief depended on proof 
that the applicant is a valuable, contributing member of society with many and deep 
ties to America.14 Nevertheless, the INA bars many of them from ever satisfying 
the good moral character requirement.15 These folks sit in a sort of limbo, neither 
deportable from the United States for their transgressions nor ever able to become 
American citizens. 
The second group is composed of those who apply for naturalization and are 
denied on character grounds in the agency’s discretion or are referred to 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for removal proceedings on the basis 
of prior conduct. Many of these denials are unlawful or unjustified. They happen 
because USCIS trains its adjudicators to deny on character grounds and directs 
them to refer applicants “who appear to be removable” to ICE for detention and 
removal,16 and adjudicators misapply the law and regulations (sometimes blatantly 
and defiantly) about good moral character.  
The third group consists of the wary, because they have heard about the second 
group. They are eligible to naturalize and are either not removable under the law or 
have solid cases for relief should the government charge them with removal. 
Despite their eligibility, they forgo applying for naturalization out of fear that old, 
minor criminal convictions will lead to federal detention, removal proceedings, or 
deportation. For these residents, the final step in their immigrant journey to 
America becomes an impossible one because the risks are too great.  
The expressively punitive nature of the INA’s current good moral character 
provision and USCIS’s misguided priorities in handling naturalization applications 
force legal resident immigrants with criminal histories to permanently live in the 
shadows of full membership, never able to possess the full rights, privileges, and 
                                                                                                                 
1300 pages long, devotes more than a single page to the good moral character requirement. 
See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA & MARYELLEN 
FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 117–18 (7th ed. 2011); 
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND 
POLICY 1307 (5th ed. 2009).  
 14. See infra Part II.A. 
 15. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2006). 
 16. See infra Part II.B. 
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respect that citizenship can bring. Part III identifies three main failures with the 
current scheme. First, permanently barring resident immigrants from citizenship, 
whether by statute or by intimidation, frustrates social cohesion by marginalizing 
the excluded and discouraging their investment in their community.17 Second, 
denying full membership to resident immigrants threatens the integrity of 
democracy. Preventing their political participation creates a class of voteless 
community residents in violation of the consent principle of democracy.18 Third, 
the current scheme wrongly denies redemption its proper place in the law by 
permanently casting individuals as morally corrupt. This conclusion contradicts the 
intent of the good moral character requirement, as well as criminological research 
on desistance from crime and emerging trends in the law on fixed character 
judgments.19 
To correct these failures, Part IV proposes reforms. It calls first for legislative 
change—Congress should eliminate the good moral character requirement entirely 
or strike the permanent statutory bar to a finding of good moral character triggered 
by certain criminal convictions. Simply put, there must be space for those legal 
residents with a distant criminal past to demonstrate their current fitness for full 
membership. Should a character requirement remain, the Article proposes changes 
to how USCIS processes naturalization applications, particularly in the handling of 
good moral character assessments. These changes include the small—such as 
ensuring that all naturalization examiners are sufficiently trained and affirmatively 
tell applicants to provide evidence of their good moral character—and the large—
ending the use of naturalization applications as a source for removal candidates. 
These changes will reduce the number of erroneous denials and denials by 
intimidation. 
The reforms proposed will not impact public safety or diminish the integrity of 
American democracy. To the contrary, they will create a naturalization scheme that 
promotes social cohesion by offering all legal permanent residents the opportunity 
to become full members; advances democracy and equality by encouraging 
unfettered economic, social, and political investment and participation in American 
communities by all; and offers redemptive citizenship to long-time residents by 
recognizing that individuals can and do reform. 
I. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION LAW 
In his sweeping history of American citizenship, Rogers Smith writes that 
“American citizenship . . . has always been an intellectually puzzling, legally 
confused, and politically charged and contested status.”20 The intense scholarly 
interest in citizenship in the last thirty years has often contributed to the muddle, 
largely because different people use the term “citizenship” to mean different things. 
In fact, scholars invoke the concept of citizenship in a host of disciplines to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. See infra Part III.A. 
 18. See infra Part III.B. 
 19. See infra Part III.C. 
 20. ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. 
HISTORY 14 (1997). 
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represent such a wide spectrum of practices and experiences that it is difficult for 
citizenship scholars to avoid talking past each other. 
In its simplest form, citizenship is a legal status that defines the relationship 
between the individual and the state. It denotes who is a full member (citizen) and 
who is not (noncitizen).21 The nation state owes to citizens the fullest protection of 
its law, and grants to citizens the broadest array of rights. Linda Bosniak calls this 
conception of citizenship “status citizenship.”22  
Besides status, there are at least three other ways to conceive of citizenship.23 
Some define citizenship by its content, arguing that to be a citizen means you 
possess a particular or minimum set of rights and privileges.24 Those who lack the 
full or necessary set are not citizens, or are described as second-class or 
semicitizens.25 Alternatively, some emphasize behavior when they invoke 
citizenship. Most famously articulated by Aristotle in Politics, this definition 
considers citizenship to be the act of participating in and shaping the political 
community, and often induces appeals to the archetype of “good citizenship.”26 
Finally, some see citizenship as a component of identity and citizens as a class of 
people who share particular characteristics or culture.27  
Further underscoring the term’s multivalence, scholars and advocates invoke 
citizenship in a variety of areas outside the relationship between the individual and 
the state. They assert a host of domains of citizenship, including the globe, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. Citizenship and noncitizenship do not exist in a dichotomous relationship. See 
THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE 
STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 5 (2002) (“[C]itizenship defines neither the category of 
the governed [which includes noncitizens] nor that of the governors [residents of Puerto Rico 
and D.C. lack voting representatives in Congress].”); ELIZABETH F. COHEN, SEMI-
CITIZENSHIP IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 36 (2009) (arguing that citizenship is a “gradient 
category”). 
 22. LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY 
MEMBERSHIP 15, 18 (2006) (defining citizenship as a legal status says nothing about the 
necessary or ideal content of the relationship it describes).  
 23. See id. at 18–20 (identifying four conceptions of citizenship: (1) as formal legal 
status; (2) as entitlement to and enjoyment of rights; (3) as the process of democratic 
political engagement; and (4) as an identity of belonging).  
 24. See, e.g., T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL 
CLASS 3 (1992) (defining citizenship as composed of essential civil, political, and social 
rights). 
 25. See COHEN, supra note 21, at 204 (describing semi-citizens as “a group of persons 
living within the boundaries of a liberal democracy who have some, but not all, of the rights 
and status associated with full citizenship in that state”). 
 26. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 18–21 (W.E. Bolland trans., 1877) (defining citizen as a 
person who has the right to participate in deliberative or judicial office); Martin Luther King, 
Jr., Address to the Montgomery Improvement Association following the arrest of Rosa Parks 
(Dec. 5, 1955), available at http://mlk-
kpp01.stanford.edu/index.php/kingpapers/article/address_to_first_montgomery_improvemen
t_association_mia_mass_meeting_at_hol/ (“We are here this evening for serious business. 
We are here in a general sense because first and foremost we are American citizens, and we 
are determined to apply our citizenship to the fullness of its meaning.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Chantal Mouffe, Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community, in 
DIMENSIONS OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 231 (1995).  
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workplace, the marketplace, the neighborhood, unions, political movements, and 
families.28 Citizenship carries a symbolic meaning as well, though one that has 
almost as many iterations as proponents. The dominant rhetorical camps emphasize 
citizenship’s contribution to national unity29 and the special affinity a citizen feels 
for his nation,30 or exalt it as the fullest manifestation of inclusive, egalitarian 
ideals.31  
When I use the term “citizenship” in this Article, I mean status citizenship—that 
is, the formal legal status of full membership within the nation state,32 which brings 
with it certain rights and perhaps some obligations.33  Conceiving of citizenship as 
a status that confers special rights, without identifying any rights that are minimally 
necessary to make out that status or behaviors and characteristics that define a 
citizen, allows for a critical assessment of both the normative ideals and practical 
realities regarding citizenship in any particular place. Through this lens, this Part 
addresses American citizenship in two sections. The first section offers a truncated 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. See BOSNIAK, supra note 22, at 20–28 (discussing the various domains and locations 
of citizenship asserted by political and legal theorists). 
 29. See SMITH, supra note 20 (arguing that exclusionary citizenship practices have 
provided an important source of cohesion in American society). 
 30. See Peter H. Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of 
American Citizenship, 3 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1989).  
 31. See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006). 
 32. Despite increasing calls for postnational understandings of citizenship, most 
scholars concede that the nation state monopolizes control over the central form of political 
membership. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STAN. L. REV. 597, 616 
(1999) (reviewing ROGER M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN 
U.S. HISTORY (1997)) (discussing the claim that membership in particular political 
communities will have little or no importance but acknowledging that it is unlikely to be 
realized anytime soon). 
 33. I prefer this conception because of the limits of the other three. As practiced, 
citizenship does not guarantee an equal or superior bundle of rights to all citizens. Some U.S. 
citizens with felony records or mental illnesses cannot vote, for example, and those who 
reside in Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico lack the same representation in Congress of 
citizens who live in the 50 states. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (“[N]o person who has 
a guardian . . . by reason of mental incapacity, appointed by a court of competent 
jurisdiction . . . shall be entitled to vote . . . .”); Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 
2000), aff’d sub nom. Alexander v. Mineta, 531 U.S. 940 (2000), aff’d, 531 U.S. 941 (2000) 
(holding that denying District of Columbia residents the right to vote in congressional 
elections is constitutional). Defining citizenship as participation likewise fails to accurately 
reflect the practiced reality of the status because acting like a citizen does not make one a 
citizen, and those citizens who do not fulfill the ideal do not lose their citizenship. See Trop 
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92 (1957) (“Citizenship is not a license that expires upon 
misbehavior.”). By conflating civicness with citizenship, the third definition does better at 
defining normative ideals than political and social fact. Finally, while the view of citizenship 
as an important component of identity holds much popular sway, it has limited application in 
today’s increasingly transnational world and fails to offer a basis for meaningful critique or 
comparison. See Michael Walzer, What Does It Mean To Be an “American”?, 71 SOC. RES. 
633, 633 (2004) (“The adjective [American] provides no reliable information about the 
origins, histories, connections, or cultures of those whom it designates.”). 
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exposition of the principles and theories underlying American citizenship and 
explains its history and functional meaning today. The second section outlines the 
current requirements for U.S. citizenship, focusing on the good moral character 
requirement. 
A. American Citizenship 
In the United States, citizenship sits atop a hierarchy of legal statuses respecting 
membership in the nation state. The other statuses, in descending order of 
protections offered by the state and rights held by the person, are (2) national;34 (3) 
lawful permanent resident; (4) refugee and asylee; (5) temporary legal resident, 
such as one admitted on time-limited tourist, student, or work visa;35 and (6) 
undocumented (illegal) immigrant.   
As historian James Kettner succinctly put it, “The status of ‘American citizen’ 
was the creation of the [American] Revolution.”36 The colonials quickly went to 
work defining citizenship in the new nation and setting the terms for access to it. 
Yet it was not immediately clear whether the Revolution had created one political 
community or a collection of many.37 Perhaps this is why the Framers said 
remarkably little about citizenship in the Constitution. The lone reference to 
naturalization in the original document grants Congress the power “[t]o establish an 
uniform Rule of Naturalization.”38 From its famous preamble, which begins “We 
the People of the United States,” and not “We the Citizens,”39 the Constitution 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. The INA confers nationality, but not citizenship, on persons born in or having ties 
with “an outlying possession of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (2006). The outlying 
possessions are defined as American Samoa and Swains Island. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(29). 
Certain inhabitants of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, who became 
U.S. citizens by virtue of Article III of the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands, may opt for noncitizen national status. Pub. L. No. 94-241, § 
301(a), 90 Stat. 263, 266 (1976). 
 35. U.S. law classifies all noncitizens as immigrants or nonimmigrants. Immigrants 
come to reside permanently in the country; those who enter as immigrants are often referred 
to as lawful permanent residents. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)–(c) (identifying the allocation of 
visas for family-sponsored immigrants, employment-based immigrants, and diversity 
immigrants). Most nonimmigrant categories involve a temporary stay of fixed direction. See 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (listing all possible categories of nonimmigrant aliens).  
 36. JAMES KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–1870, 208 
(1978). One of the grievances laid against King George III in 1776 was that he was 
“obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners.” THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE para. 9 (U.S. 1776); see KETTNER, supra, at 104–05 (discussing, for example, 
a 1773 British order-in-council instructing colonial governors not to assent to further 
naturalizations and the colonists’ view that the denial of the right to determine the 
membership of their community was another strike at the liberty and prosperity of 
Americans). 
 37. KETTNER, supra note 36, at 209. 
 38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 39. U.S. CONST. pmbl. Indeed, the Supreme Court does not equate “the people” with 
citizens, but considers some noncitizens to be part of “the People of the United States.” 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). In a concurring opinion, 
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appears to deliberately avoid using the word citizen when possible. It bestows 
rights to persons, not citizens, and sets the boundaries of permissible government 
action in its relations to persons, not citizens.40 Indeed, the Framers made nothing 
depend on citizenship explicitly (not even the franchise) except the public offices of 
president, congressperson, and senator.41 Where the Constitution uses “citizen” 
specifically, it does so either to establish requirements for elective office, declare 
that state citizens are entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several states,42 or prohibit denying the right to vote based on race, sex, or other 
characteristics.43  
The only constitutional provision that can be said to relate to a qualification for 
citizenship is the Fourteenth Amendment.44 Enacted following the Dred Scott 
decision45 and the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment provides a simple 
definition of citizen as anyone born or naturalized in the United States.46 The 
Constitution says nothing else about the qualifications for, or the duties of, 
citizenship.47 This led political theorist Alexander Bickel to conclude, perhaps 
somewhat aspirationally, that “we live under a Constitution to which the [simple] 
concept of citizenship matters very little, that prescribes decencies and wise 
modalities of government quite without regard to the concept of citizenship.”48  
Devoid of content, however, citizenship performs no function. If membership 
means nothing, there is no reason to seek it, promote it, or grant it. Not 
                                                                                                                 
Justice Stevens agreed that “the people” should be read to include, at the least, anyone 
“lawfully present in the United States.” Id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 40. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 35–36 (1975).  
 41. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (requiring House representatives be seven-year citizens); 
id. art. I, § 3 (requiring senators be nine-year citizens); id. art. II, § 1 (requiring president be a 
natural-born citizen). 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 43. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (race, color, previous condition of servitude), amend. 
XIX (sex), amend. XXIV (taxes), and amend. XXVI (minimum voting age no higher than 
eighteen). 
 44. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 829 (1970) (“[A]lthough one might have expected a 
definition of citizenship in constitutional terms, none was embraced in the original document 
or, indeed, in any of the amendments adopted prior to the War Between the States.”). 
 45. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that people of African descent, 
imported into the United States and held as slaves, and their descendants—whether or not 
they were slaves—were not protected by the Constitution and could never be citizens of the 
United States). 
 46. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898) (stating there are “two 
sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization”).  
 47. BICKEL, supra note 40, at 42–46. This is not to say that citizenship had no 
significance in the early Republic. It was quickly put to work as a racially-exclusive, 
rights-bearing device. Limited to “free white person[s],” it conferred the strongest protection 
of property rights. See Naturalization Act of January 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414, 414  
(limiting naturalization to “free white person[s]”); KETTNER, supra note 36.  
 48. BICKEL, supra note 40, at 53–54. But see COHEN, supra note 21, at 29 (constitutions 
commonly conflate “persons governed” with “citizens” and use the words “citizen” and 
“person” nearly interchangeably, “despite the fact that many of the persons directly governed 
by any given constitution are not full citizens. This makes the text of constitutions unreliable 
sources of ultimate authority on the meaning of citizenship . . . .”).  
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surprisingly, almost everyone agrees that “citizenship means something.”49 The 
Supreme Court has variously referred to it as “a status in and relationship with a 
society . . . more basic than mere presence or residence,”50 “a most precious 
right,”51 and the “right to have rights.”52 Congress has called it “the most valued 
governmental benefit of this land.”53 
Unsurprisingly, American history demonstrates that the status of citizenship has 
mattered quite a lot.54 As mentioned above, in Dred Scott, the Supreme Court 
justified denying rights to slaves and free blacks based on their lack of 
citizenship.55 The Civil War and the intense battle after it regarding the full 
implication of the Fourteenth Amendment’s grant of citizenship to African 
Americans revealed the tremendous consequence of access to citizenship.56 Over 
the course of the twentieth century, American citizenship came to be seen as a 
method for ensuring full and equal treatment by offering an expanded set of rights 
to each citizen.57 The robust egalitarian potential of citizenship took firm hold in 
the 1950s and 1960s largely through the discourse of the civil rights movement and 
decisions of the Warren Court, which linked equality and rights to citizenship.58 
This expansive and inclusionary project sought to make sure that all citizens were 
capable of fully participating in society and successfully used citizenship to remove 
longstanding barriers to equal participation and treatment.59 
                                                                                                                 
 
 49. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36, 114 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 50. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 652 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 51. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159 (1963).  
 52. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
 53. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, NATURALIZATION AMENDMENTS OF 1989, H. REP. NO. 
101-187, at 14 (1989). 
 54. See generally KETTNER, supra note 36; SMITH, supra note 20. 
 55. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 56. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding state laws requiring 
racial segregation in private businesses); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not outlaw racial discrimination by private individuals and 
organizations, and that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional); and Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (holding that a statute restricting jury service to white 
men violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 57. The evolution of the content of citizenship was famously articulated by British 
sociologist T.H. Marshall in a seminal 1950 essay. Marshall, supra note 24. According to 
Marshall, during the eighteenth century a core set of civil rights held by citizens were 
established, such as liberty, freedom of speech and religion, the right to own property and 
make contracts, and access to courts. Id. at 8. Political rights were added to the bundle in the 
nineteenth century as the right to vote was slowly made available to more than just property-
holding white males. Id. In the twentieth century, social rights to a basic level of economic 
welfare and security became linked to citizenship and made true equality and liberty for all 
citizens possible. Id. 
 58. During Earl Warren’s time as chief justice, the Supreme Court expanded the 
substantive reach of rights in the areas of criminal procedure, due process, voting, speech, 
and privacy and incorporated many of the rights found in the Bill of Rights against the states. 
See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1998). 
 59. See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 21, at 72 (noting the Warren Court demonstrated that 
the “ideal of citizenship could be a powerful tool in the extension of rights, the ending of 
second-class citizenship, and the inclusion of previously subordinated and marginalized 
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Today, the central significance of citizenship is found in the right to vote60 and 
the right to remain. Citizens cannot be deported.61 According to immigration 
scholar Cristina Rodriguez, the “indefeasible right to remain . . . is what makes the 
status [of citizen] irreplaceable.”62 It provides security to the citizen and her family 
and friends in sustained relationships.63 The right to vote also protects the 
individual by providing an equal voice in the process of choosing leaders and 
defining community norms.64 Together, these two rights make possible a more 
active and participatory democracy by giving residents a voice in their government 
and eliminating any fear of removal for their activities.65  
Citizenship brings many other rights and benefits, including traveling with a 
U.S. passport, eligibility for public jobs, becoming an elected official, and not 
having to carry and renew immigration papers.66 A citizen can bring family 
members to the United States more easily and swiftly than a noncitizen, and can 
obtain citizenship for children born abroad.67 Moreover, in a liberal democracy like 
the United States, an inclusive, robust citizenship regime promotes equality by 
promising equal treatment to all residents, fosters dynamic political participation by 
                                                                                                                 
groups”); Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1977) (“The Warren Court . . . did not invent the idea 
of equal citizenship, but recognized that its time had come.”). From the perspective of the 
noncitizen, Warren’s privileging of citizenship as a conduit of rights only goes so far. See 
BICKEL, supra note 40, at 53–54. 
 60. This was not always so. In the past, noncitizens could vote, while many citizens (for 
example, women and blacks) could not. See generally RON HAYDUK, DEMOCRACY FOR ALL: 
RESTORING IMMIGRANT VOTING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 15–40 (2006); Jamin B. 
Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical 
Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391 (1993). 
 61. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (“Jurisdiction in the executive to 
order deportation exists only if the person arrested is an alien.”). Citizens can be 
denaturalized and then deported. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), (e) (2006) (authorizing the 
government to revoke a grant of citizenship that was “illegally procured or . . . procured by 
concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation” and authorizing courts to set 
aside an individual's grant of naturalization upon a criminal conviction for knowingly 
committing naturalization fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1425). 
 62. Cristina M. Rodriguez, 103 AMER. J. INT’L LAW 180, 186–87 (2009) (reviewing 
PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP AFTER GLOBALIZATION 
(2008)). 
 63. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Citizenship Paradox in a Transnational Age, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 1111, 1120–21 (2008) (noting that it is destabilizing for citizen children to 
have a parent whose presence in the United States is not secure). 
 64. See Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 331 (1993) 
(“[V]oting is a meaningful participatory act through which individuals create and affirm their 
membership in the community and thereby transform their identities both as individuals and 
as part of a greater collectivity.”). 
 65. For example, noncitizens are deportable for “any activity a purpose of which is the 
opposition to, or the control or overthrow of, the Government of the United States by force, 
violence, or other unlawful means.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)(iii). This includes protected 
First Amendment activity for which citizens cannot be punished. 
 66. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., A GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION M-476, at 3 
(2011) [hereinafter USCIS, A GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION].  
 67. Id. 
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granting community members the right to shape their community through the 
franchise, and facilitates social cohesion by offering a unifying identity and a sense 
of belonging in a diverse, transnational world.68 
Consistent with the many benefits of citizenship, various programs and laws 
encourage noncitizens to naturalize. USCIS, the administrative agency that 
currently handles naturalization applicants, houses an Office of Citizenship to 
foster immigrant integration and encourage U.S. citizenship.69 Among other things, 
the Office of Citizenship leads initiatives to promote citizenship and provides 
grants, materials, and assistance to national and community-based organizations 
that prepare immigrants for citizenship.70 Several states also have citizenship 
assistance programs that encourage and help immigrants to naturalize.71  
Public benefits legislation can also include restrictions or prohibitions for 
noncitizens that incentivize naturalization. For example, most legal permanent 
residents are currently barred from federal means-tested public benefits such as 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Medicaid, and food stamps for five 
years after entering the country, and barred from supplemental security income 
(SSI) until citizenship.72 Courts have upheld these provisions, finding that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 68. See infra Part III. 
 69. See generally Office of Citizenship, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (DEC. 12, 
2011), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543 
f6d1a/?vgnextoid=a5e314c0cee47210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=a5
e314c0cee47210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD. The Office of Citizenship was created by 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to promote instruction and training on citizenship 
responsibilities for aliens interested in becoming naturalized citizens of the United States, 
including the development of educational materials. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 
U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006). 
 70. USCIS awarded millions in federal funding in 2011 to support citizenship education 
and preparation programs for lawful permanent residents. See USCIS Announces FY 2011 
Citizenship and Integration Grant Program Recipients $9 Million Awarded to Expand 
Citizenship Preparation Programs for Permanent Residents Fact Sheet, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGR. SERVICES (Sept. 21, 2011), 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1 
a/?vgnextoid=61e8a0920dc82310VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=68439c
7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD. 
 71. See ANN MORSE & AIDA ORGOCKA, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
IMMIGRANTS TO CITIZENS: A ROLE FOR STATE LEGISLATORS 5 (2004), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/immig/immigrantstocitizens.pdf. 
 72.  See generally Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 
Pub. L. 104-193 § 400, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260 (1996); 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a) (2006) (stating most 
legal immigrants are ineligible for most federal means-tested public benefits for five years 
after their date of entry); 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(3) (barring most permanent residents from 
receiving SSI or food stamps). But see 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(3)(C) 
(stating asylees and refugees are eligible for food stamps, five years of Medicaid, and seven 
years of SSI); 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(E) (articulating that lawful permanent residents legally 
residing in the United States before August 22, 1996, are eligible for SSI benefits); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1612 (b)(2)(B) (asserting those who have paid social security taxes for ten years are 
eligible for SSI benefits). 
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encouraging naturalization is a legitimate governmental interest justifying 
discrimination against noncitizens.73 
The benefits reserved to citizens illustrate that citizenship necessarily operates 
as a tool of exclusion and subordination. Indeed, for much of American history, 
American citizenship was a racially exclusive status. From 1790 until the end of the 
Civil War, naturalization was limited to free whites.74 African Americans and many 
native-born nonwhites first secured the right to citizenship through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s birthright citizenship provision.75 Native American Indians were 
excluded from birthright citizenship until 1924,76 and many foreign-born 
immigrants continued to be denied the opportunity to naturalize by racial and 
national origin restrictions on citizenship until their final elimination in 1952.77 
Today, no one is per se barred from naturalizing on the basis of race or national 
origin.  
The important distinction between citizen and noncitizen has become more 
consequential in recent years. At the federal level, Congress passed three major 
pieces of legislation in 1996 that significantly curtailed the rights and benefits of 
noncitizens: the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act (also known as the Welfare Reform Act).78 Many have 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. For example, the Seventh Circuit held that, although it is not found in Congress’s 
statement of policy in the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, the legitimate government interest in 
encouraging naturalization provided a rational basis for upholding the challenged portions of 
the Act that barred legal permanent residents from receiving SSI and food stamps. City of 
Chicago v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598, 608 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1036 (2000) 
(“The Act gives resident aliens in need of welfare benefits a strong economic incentive to 
become naturalized citizens.”); see also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 105 
(1976) (stating that a citizenship requirement for federal service would be “justified by the 
national interest in providing an incentive for aliens to become naturalized”). 
 74. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (repealed 1795) (restricting 
naturalization to any “free white person” who met the residency and character requirements).  
 75. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. There 
has been much recent attention on birthright citizenship, including proposals by members of 
Congress to eliminate or amend it. See, e.g., Rogers M. Smith, Birthright Citizenship and the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 and 2008, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1329, 1333 (2009). 
 76. Citizenship Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253, 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 3 
(2006)) (“[A]ll noncitizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States be, 
and they are hereby, declared to be citizens of the United States.”). 
 77. See generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW (10th Anniversary ed. 2006); 
SMITH, supra note 20. For a specific case example, see United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 
261 U.S. 204 (1923) (denying naturalization to applicant from India because he was not a 
“white person” as required by statute). Despite this discriminatory history, the arc of U.S. 
citizenship is one of an ever-increasing inclusion. In 2009, the United States naturalized 
people from almost 200 different countries. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 23, tbl.21 (2010) 
[hereinafter 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS]. 
 78. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (increasing the number of crimes that 
made a lawful immigrant ineligible for naturalization and deportable, and making effecting 
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observed that the 1996 laws “were intended, among other goals, to increase sharply 
the value of American citizenship while reducing the value of permanent legal 
resident status.”79 Recent state and local anti-immigrant provisions, such as 
Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070, have reinforced the importance of the status of 
citizenship in the United States.80 
At its core, then, U.S. citizenship is a legal status that defines a relationship 
between the state and the individual. As originally intended, it lacked substantive 
content. Instead of being a rights-bearing device, it was largely a tool of (white) 
cohesion, bringing together a rapidly growing population under a unifying identity 
that helped the nation develop as a nation. Citizenship quickly evolved to deliver 
significant content, although never to all citizens equally. By the last third of the 
twentieth century, the Supreme Court had worked to ensure that all citizens held a 
robust set of political, civil, and social rights, diminishing longstanding barriers to 
equal participation and treatment and bringing America closer to its egalitarian and 
inclusive ideals. Yet throughout this history, and resurgently today, citizenship has 
also served as a tool of exclusion and subordination. While the original racist 
distinctions have faded in modern law, new restrictions and barriers to citizenship 
have arisen. This Article now turns to one such barrier: the good moral character 
requirement.  
B. Good Moral Character Requirement 
With the notable exception of the explicit racial and national origin restrictions 
that lasted until 1952, U.S. naturalization has been relatively easy to obtain 
compared to other nations.81 Still, various requirements have been imposed to 
                                                                                                                 
that deportation easier, if not mandatory); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWOR), Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (eliminating 
immigrant eligibility for various public benefits). Several provisions of PRWOR, also known 
as the Welfare Reform Act, were later found unconstitutional or repealed, or their impact on 
lawful immigrants was reduced. 
 79. Peter H. Schuck, The Re-Evaluation of American Citizenship, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
1, 2 (1997). 
 80. For the Justice Department’s challenge to S.B. 1070, see United States v. Arizona, 
641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted 132 S. Ct. 845 (2011). In just the last five years, 
states and localities have passed dozens of laws that authorize local police to enforce federal 
immigration laws, that require proof of legal status to access benefits, and that impose 
English-only rules. See, e.g., Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and 
Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1557 (2008). These measures, while often 
aimed at undocumented immigrants, effectively devalue legal permanent residents by casting 
suspicion on all immigrants and discouraging citizens and businesses from working with and 
catering to them. See, e.g., Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, 
Latinos, Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 
55, 72–81 (2009) (arguing that such measures lead to discrimination against members of 
ethnic minority groups perceived as foreign regardless of immigration or citizenship status).  
 81. See KETTNER, supra note 36 (arguing that the desire to spur population growth and 
economic expansion accounted for liberal naturalization laws); Peter H. Schuck, 
Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American Citizenship, 3 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 1 (1989); Patrick Weil, Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality 
Laws, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 17 (T. Alexander 
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guard the gates. This section explains how the good moral character requirement 
has been interpreted by courts, and how the statutory definition has evolved from 
one with no crime-based character bars to today’s broad provisions that trigger a 
permanent, irrebuttable presumption of a lack of good moral character.  
The INA lays out a series of qualifications for those hoping to naturalize. An 
applicant for naturalization must: 
(1) be a legal permanent resident,82  
(2) be 18 or more years old,83  
(3) meet both a continuous residence and physical presence requirement,84 and 
(4) be of good moral character during the required residence period and up to 
the time of admission.85  
A character requirement for naturalization has existed since 1790.86 It aims to 
ensure that the applicant is fit for membership, and will not be disruptive or 
destructive to the community.87 In addition, it was likely meant to protect the 
political process by helping to assure a virtuous polity.88  
                                                                                                                 
Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2001). 
 82. 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (2006). 
 83. Id. § 1445(b). 
 84. See id. § 1427 for the various residence and presence requirements. 
 85. Id. §§ 1427(a)(3), 1430(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. §§ 316.2(a)(7), 316.10, 329.2(d) (2010). The 
United States is not unique in requiring good character for those who acquire citizenship by 
means other than birth. Several democratic states have a similar requirement. Australia, 
France, Ireland, Portugal, South Africa, and the United Kingdom require proof of good 
character, and several other countries require the absence of a serious criminal conviction for 
naturalization, including Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, and Sweden. See 
Weil, supra note 81, at 22–23 tbl.1-2. Further provisions require that the applicant: be 
attached to the principles of the Constitution and well disposed to the good order and 
happiness of the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3); be willing to bear arms, perform 
noncombatant service, or to perform work of national importance, id. § 1448(a)(5)(A)–(C); 
demonstrate knowledge of English language, U.S. history, and government, id. § 
1448(a)(5)(A)–(C); and not be otherwise barred as a subversive, Communist party member, 
or convicted deserter during war time. Id. § 1425. 
 86. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (repealed 1795) (requiring 
applicants to demonstrate that they were “of good character”). The word “moral” was added 
in 1795. See Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414, 414 (repealed 1802). This 
followed the tradition that had been set up by most states after independence of requiring 
proof of good character for state citizenship. See KETTNER, supra note 36, at 218. Prior to 
1940, the statute read “behaved as a man of good moral character.” Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 
3592, 34 Stat. 596, 597. Since 1940, the statute has read “has been and still is a person of 
good moral character.” Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1138, 1142 (repealed 
1952). This amendment induced no discernible change in good moral character assessments. 
 87. See Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 23 (1913) (“[I]t was contemplated that his 
admission [to citizenship] should be mutually beneficial to the Government and himself, the 
proof in respect of his . . . moral character . . . being exacted because of what [it] promised 
for the future, rather than for what [it] told of the past.”). 
 88. Spiro, supra note 13, at 516. “Good moral character” is a requirement for a broad 
range of immigration benefits. A noncitizen seeking relief under the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA), must establish that she is a person of good moral character. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1184(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(bb). So must a noncitizen seeking permanent residence under the 
special registry provision. See id. § 1259. Good moral character is a requirement for “special 
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In most cases, the time period during which good moral character must be 
demonstrated is the five years preceding the naturalization application.89 The 
applicant bears the burden of establishing her good moral character.90 The INA 
does not provide an affirmative statutory definition of what constitutes good moral 
character in the naturalization context.91 Indeed, until 1952, the statute provided no 
guidance whatsoever on the character determination. Where the statute does not bar 
a finding (the specifics of which shall be discussed presently), the standard to be 
applied was judicially defined on a case-by-case basis.92 
The first reported case to discuss good moral character was the 1878 decision In 
re Spenser.93 In it, a federal district court held that the standard for determining 
good moral character will vary from generation to generation, and declared that 
“probably the average man of the country is as high as it can be set.”94 The court 
stated that violating the law ought generally to be considered immoral, but 
recognized distinctions between malum en se and malum prohibitum,95 as well as 
                                                                                                                 
rule cancellation” under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act 
(NACARA), see NACARA, Pub. L. No. 105-100, § 203(b), 111 Stat. 2160, 2196 (1997), 
and certain applications for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence. See, e.g., 8 
C.F.R. § 245.23(a)(5) (good moral character required for T visa applicants). A nonlawful 
permanent resident who is seeking relief in the form of Cancellation of Removal must 
establish her good moral character during the ten-year period preceding the date of the 
application. 8 U.S.C. § 1228b(b)(1)(B). A noncitizen seeking voluntary departure at the 
conclusion of removal proceedings must establish good moral character for the five-year 
period preceding the application for voluntary departure. See id. § 1229c. 
 89. Generally, applicants must be a continuous resident for five years subsequent to 
obtaining legal permanent resident status and continuously reside in the United States from 
the date of filing the application. That five-year period is reduced to three years if the 
applicant is married to a U.S. citizen if the citizen spouse has been a citizen for three years 
and the parties have been living in marital union for three years. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)–(b). 
For Armed Services veterans, the residency period is waived completely. See id. § 1439.  
 90. See Berenyi v. District Director, 385 U.S. 630, 637 (1967); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(1). 
The applicant must demonstrate her good moral character by a preponderance of the 
evidence. See id. § 316.2(b).  
 91. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (outlining who cannot establish good moral character). 
 92. Naturalization petitions originally could be filed in “any common law court of 
record” where the applicant had resided for at least the previous year. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, 
ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (repealed 1795). As a result, for much of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, state and federal district courts reviewed naturalization applications 
directly. Only since 1990 have naturalization applications been determined in the first 
instance by an administrative immigration official. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-649, § 407(d)(14)(B), 104 Stat. 4978, 5044 (giving the Attorney General authority to 
naturalize a citizen without permission from the district court); Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 
379, 386 (4th Cir. 2007). Federal district courts review appeals of denials de novo. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1421(c). Federal district courts also have jurisdiction over a naturalization 
application if USCIS fails to grant or deny an application before the end of the 120-day 
period after the date on which the naturalization examination is conducted. See id. § 1447(b). 
 93. In re Spenser, 22 F. Cas. 921 (C.C.D. Or. 1878). 
 94. Id. at 921. 
 95. “Malum in se” describes a crime or act that is inherently immoral, such as murder, 
while “malum prohibitum” describes an act that is a crime merely because it is prohibited by 
statute, although the act itself is not necessarily immoral, such as jaywalking. See BLACK’S 
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between isolated acts of wrongdoing and habitual conduct.96 Following Spenser, 
most courts applied a flexible, community-based standard for evaluating good 
moral character that used the average citizen as a benchmark.97 The standard, 
courts made clear, was “not penal; it does not mean to punish for past conduct.”98 
Instead, it contemplated prior transgressions and recognized the potential for 
reform because “circumstances may change us all.”99  
Given the statute’s requirement of showing good moral character only during 
the required residence and physical presence period, it was long the law that an 
applicant’s conduct outside that period could not be used per se to deny a finding of 
good moral character.100 That is, judges could not rely exclusively on convictions 
or criminal conduct to which the applicant admitted from outside the five-year 
period preceding the application to deny naturalization on character grounds. As 
many courts stated, an applicant’s “past is of course some index of what is 
permanent in their make-up, but the test is what they will be, if they become 
citizens.”101 
Accordingly, the immigration service historically trained its nationality 
examiners to take a redemptive view toward prior criminal conduct.102 A 
                                                                                                                 
LAW DICTIONARY 978–79 (8th ed. 2004). 
 96. See Spenser, 22 F. Cas. at 922. The court added that certain “infamous” crimes, such 
as murder, robbery, theft, bribery, and perjury, should automatically disqualify an applicant 
from demonstrating good moral character, though no authority stated as much. This appears 
to be an early common law articulation of what today is the (much broader) per se bar to a 
finding of good moral character based on criminal convictions found in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). 
 97. See Lisa H. Newton, On Coherence in the Law: A Study of the “Good Moral 
Character” Requirement in the Naturalization Statute, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 40 (1972); Comment, 
The Evaluation of Good Moral Character in Naturalization Proceedings, 38 ALB. L. REV. 
895 (1974); Note, Naturalization and the Adjudication of Good Moral Character: An 
Exercise in Judicial Uncertainty, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 546 (1972). As the above articles show, 
however, little rationality or uniformity emerged from the case law. 
 98. Posusta v. United States, 285 F.2d 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 99. Id. at 535; see, e.g., id. at 535–36 (granting naturalization to applicant despite her 
adultery prior to the five-year statutory period, remarking that “a person may have a ‘good 
moral character’ though he has been delinquent upon occasion in the past”); 
Santamaria-Ames v. INS, 104 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1996).  
 100. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) (requiring proof of good moral character only during the 
required residency period); Ikenokwalu-White v. INS, 316 F.3d 798, 805 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(“[C]onduct predating the relevant statutory time period may be considered relevant to the 
moral character determination . . . but that such conduct cannot be used as the sole basis for 
an adverse finding on that element.”); Santamaria-Ames, 104 F.3d at 1132 (same). That is 
not to say that pre-period conduct could never be considered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(e) (“[T]he 
Attorney General shall not be limited to the applicant's conduct during the five years 
preceding the filing of the application, but may take into consideration as a basis for such 
determination the applicant's conduct and acts at any time prior to that period.”); 8 C.F.R. § 
316.10(a)(2) (allowing consideration of pre-period conduct “if the conduct of the applicant 
during the statutory period does not reflect that there has been reform of character from an 
earlier period or if the earlier conduct and acts appear relevant to a determination of the 
applicant's present moral character”). 
 101. Posusta, 285 F.2d at 536. 
 102. In 1926, Congress formally authorized the federal courts to designate examiners 
from the Bureau of Naturalization to conduct preliminary hearings, and permitted a court to 
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mid-twentieth century Nationality Manual for agency employees stated that “[i]n 
fixing specific periods during which an applicant must establish his good moral 
character, Congress undoubtedly intended to provide for the reformation of those 
who have been guilty of past misdeeds.”103 The manual declared that the good 
moral character provision “makes ample allowance for reformation,” so much so 
that it was the service’s position that “[n]otwithstanding that a petitioner may have 
been convicted of murder prior to the statutory period, he may nevertheless be in a 
position to establish good moral character.”104  
While some courts, particularly early in the twentieth century, felt that any 
violation of the law showed a lack of good moral character, the bulk of midcentury 
good moral character cases exhibited a more nuanced and redemptive view.105 As 
Learned Hand described the judge’s task at the time, “[w]e must own that the 
statute imposes upon courts a task impossible of assured execution; people differ as 
much about moral conduct as they do about beauty.”106 The standard permitted a 
finding of good moral character, for example, despite an applicant’s preperiod 
convictions for armed robbery and breaking into a U.S. Post Office with intent to 
commit larceny.107 It even allowed for a grant of citizenship to an applicant who 
had pled guilty to manslaughter five years and a few weeks before his application 
and had been in prison for part of the five-year period during which he had to 
demonstrate his good moral character.108 In another case, the court denied a 
                                                                                                                 
grant naturalization without live testimony if it accepted the examiner's favorable findings 
and recommendations. See Act of June 8, 1926, ch. 502, 44 Stat. 709 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
399a (1926)), repealed by Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 504, 34 Stat. 1140, 1172. The 
advisory character of the preliminary examination, and the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
courts to naturalize, was maintained in later codifications. See Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952 (INA), ch. 447, §§ 310, 335–36, 66 Stat. 239, 255–58 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1421, 1446–47 (2006)); Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, §§ 301, 333–34, 54 Stat. 
at 1156 (repealed 1952). In 1990, Congress granted the attorney general authority to 
naturalize a citizen without permission from a court, initiating the current system of 
administrative naturalization. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 
§ 407(d)(14)(B), 104 Stat. 4978, 5044. 
 103. IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY SERV., NATIONALITY MANUAL: FOR THE USE OF 
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE § 773 
(1944). 
 104. Id. at § 774 (Mar. 15, 1952). The Manual cited approvingly a district court case in 
which naturalization was granted to an individual who had been convicted of murder in the 
first degree thirty years before his naturalization application. Id. at § 774 (citing In re 
Balestrieri, 59 F. Supp. 181, 182 (N.D. Ca. 1945) (noting that petitioner was pardoned by the 
Governor of California for his crime, and that he has behaved as a person of good moral 
character for the five years preceding his petition)). 
 105. See Martin Shapiro, Morals and the Courts: The Reluctant Crusaders, 45 MINN. L. 
REV. 897, 912 (1961) (“[C]ourts came to recognize that if Congress had intended so harsh a 
standard it could easily have said so, and that in adopting a phrase such as ‘good moral 
character’ Congress must have meant to assign to the courts some task other than the purely 
legal one of determining whether a statute had been violated.”). 
 106. Johnson v. United States, 186 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1951). 
 107. See Pignatello v. Attorney General of the United States, 350 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1965) 
(finding applicant not statutorily barred from demonstrating good moral character despite old 
convictions). 
 108. See Dadonna v. United States, 170 F.2d 964, 966 (2d Cir. 1948) (“Good behavior 
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naturalization petition because the applicant had deliberately put to death his bed-
ridden, blind, mute, and deformed thirteen-year-old son within five years of his 
application; but “wish[ed] to make it plain that a new petition would not be open to 
this objection; and that the pitiable event, now long past, will not prevent [the 
applicant] from taking his place among us as a citizen.”109 
All of this is to say that present good moral character was long the touchstone of 
the character inquiry for a naturalization applicant.110 A more stringent, or 
backward-focused, conception of good moral character would result in the archaic 
and uncompromising view that people are beyond redemption or change. As the 
Ninth Circuit noted, “Such a conclusion would require a holding that Congress had 
enacted a legislative doctrine of . . . eternal damnation. All modern legislation 
dealing with crime and punishment proceeds upon the theory that aside from 
capital cases, no man is beyond redemption. We think a like principle underlies 
these provisions for naturalization.”111 In short, federal courts recognized that, with 
respect to an applicant’s moral character, “Congress has made the judgment that 
rehabilitation is possible.”112 
USCIS ostensibly adopts this position, claiming to view the good moral 
character requirement as reflecting a congressional intent “to make provision for 
the reformation and eventual naturalization of persons who were guilty of past 
misconduct.”113 As such, USCIS generally precludes “a denial of naturalization 
when conduct had been exemplary during the statutory period, and the only adverse 
facts concerned offenses committed outside such period.”114 That said, USCIS can 
deny a naturalization applicant on moral character grounds based on prior criminal 
conduct in two ways: (1) finding that the applicant is barred from showing it by 
statute, and (2) finding that the applicant has not met her burden of establishing her 
good moral character.  
In 1952, Congress revamped the immigration and naturalization laws, passing 
the comprehensive McCarran-Walter Act (known as the INA).115 It provided the 
first definition (of sorts) for good moral character in the citizenship context. While 
offering no affirmative definition, Congress listed in section 101(f) a series of 
offenses that would preclude a person from demonstrating good moral character if 
they were committed during the five-year period immediately preceding the 
application.116 Included in the list were habitual drunkenness, adultery, polygamy, 
                                                                                                                 
during incarceration may be one indication of the fitness of the applicant to assume the 
duties of citizenship.”). 
 109. Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152, 153–54 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 110. See Yuen Jung v. Barber, 184 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1950) (stating that Congress 
had the “deliberate intention . . . to make only present good moral character relevant.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 111. Santamaria-Ames v. INS, 104 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Yuen Jung 
v. Barber, 184 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1950)). 
 112. United States v. Hovsepian, 422 F.3d 883, 886 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 113. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTERPRETATION 316.1 NATURALIZATION REQUIREMENTS, at 
*1, *13 (2001), 2001 WL 1333876.  
 114. Id. at *14.  
 115. INA, Pub. L. No. 414, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163. 
 116. Id. § 101(f), 66 Stat. at 172 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)). According to the 
INS, “the definition governing the ‘good moral character’ criterion . . . has intentionally been 
left open-ended.” 58 Fed. Reg. 49,905, 49,909 (Sept. 24, 1993). 
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deriving one’s income principally from illegal gambling, and spending more than 
180 days in jail.117 Section 101(f) also introduced for the first time a permanent bar 
to a good moral character finding based on prior conduct: a murder conviction at 
any time meant an individual could never demonstrate the requisite moral character 
for citizenship.118 Finally, a catch-all provision stated that “[t]he fact that any 
person is not within any of the foregoing classes shall not preclude a finding that 
for other reasons such a person is or was not of good moral character.”119  
The 1952 revisions provided courts with some guidance and limited their 
discretion on the character inquiry. It reflected a belief that the prerequisite of good 
moral character should be “even more strictly applied in determining the fitness of 
an applicant for citizenship.”120 While the new provisions were criticized by the 
President’s Commission on Immigration and Nationality as too narrow and 
mechanical,121 they did not indicate that any criminality should result in a denial on 
character grounds. Indeed, the act of listing certain behaviors and not others 
undoubtedly left some courts with the impression that a redemptive view should 
remain the approach for all other criminal acts.122 
Since Congress first introduced explicit bars to a good moral character finding, 
the list has grown exponentially. The greatest expansion followed the invention of 
the term “aggravated felony” for immigration purposes in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1988.123 Part of an effort to reduce international drug trafficking, the statute 
defined three specific crimes as aggravated felonies: murder, any drug trafficking 
crime, and any illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices.124 A noncitizen 
convicted of an aggravated felony after entry was deportable.125  
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act’s targeted definition of “aggravated felony” suggests 
that Congress did not intend to use the provision to rid the country of all 
immigrants with a criminal record.126 Two years later, however, Congress 
broadened the reach of “aggravated felony” in two important ways. First, it 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. Adultery and simple possession of marijuana were removed from the list. 
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 2(c)(1), 95 
Stat. 1611, 1611; H.R. REP. 97-264, at 11 (1981) (“Although a person could still be found to 
lack good moral character if he or she engaged in adultery or were convicted for simple 
possession of marijuana, such a finding would not be mandatory.”).  
 118. INA, § 101(f)(8), 66 Stat. at 172. 
 119. Id. § 101(f), 66 Stat. at 172. 
 120. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 712 (1950). 
 121. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE 
SHALL WELCOME 246 (1953) (recommending that the INA offer no definition at all). 
 122. Moreover, despite the new statutory character bars, courts nevertheless found 
exceptions and granted naturalization despite the existence of a statutory bar. See, e.g., In re 
Perdiak, 162 F. Supp. 76, 77 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (finding false testimony lacked materiality and 
granting naturalization). 
 123. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified in scattered titles and sections of 
U.S.C.). 
 124. See id. § 7342, 102 Stat. at 4469 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). 
 125. See id. 
 126. See Andrew David Kennedy, Note, Expedited Injustice: The Problems Regarding 
the Current Law of Expedited Removal of Aggravated Felons, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1847, 1854 
(2007). 
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expanded the definition of “aggravated felony” to include any “crime of violence” 
for which the person was sentenced to greater than five years and “any illicit 
trafficking in any controlled substance.”127 Second, it added a provision that barred 
anyone convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after passage of the act from 
ever establishing good moral character.128 This eliminated an individual inquiry for 
any naturalization applicant convicted of an aggravated felony after November 29, 
1990, substituting a per se conclusion regarding the applicant’s moral character that 
survived indefinitely.129  
The character bar triggered by a conviction for an aggravated felony applies 
even if the conviction predates the five-year period during which good moral 
character must be shown, even if the conviction was obtained when a person was a 
teenager,130 and even when there is overwhelming evidence of the individual’s 
rehabilitation since the crime. With this change, Congress imposed the fixed 
character judgment that the rule requiring good character only during the residency 
period rejected and that federal courts and agency training materials had long 
denied. 
Congress broadened the definition of “aggravated felony” further in 1994 and 
1996. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA)131 did the most work, reducing the sentence length requirements for a 
crime of theft or violence to qualify as an aggravated felony from five years to one 
year, and increasing the number of crimes that qualify as aggravated felonies.132 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501(a)(3), 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 
(providing that “any crime of violence . . . for which the term of imprisonment imposed 
(regardless of any suspension of such imprisonment) is at least five years” would be 
considered an aggravated felony); 18 U.S.C. § 16 (defining “crime of violence” as “(a) an 
offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by 
its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of 
another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”). The 1990 Act also modified 
the law to include state law convictions in the definition of “aggravated felony.” See 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). 
 128. See Immigration Act of 1990, § 509, 104 Stat. at 5051. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See Donaldson v. Acosta, 163 Fed. Appx. 261 (5th Cir. 2006) (denying 
naturalization based on “aggravated felony” marijuana conviction when respondent was 
nineteen years old even though it was his only conviction, he was granted deferred 
adjudication, and the criminal court later dismissed the case).  
 131. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 
296 nn. 4 & 6 (2001) (noting that while “aggravated felony” has “been defined expansively, 
it was broadened substantially by IIRIRA to include more “minor crimes”).  
 132. See IIRIRA, § 321, 110 Stat. at 3009-627. IIRIRA also expanded what counts as a 
“conviction” for immigration purposes, created expedited removal and mandatory detention 
for “aggravated felons,” and restricted the availability of relief and judicial review for 
removal orders. See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation 
Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1939–43 
(2000). 
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Today, the definition of “aggravated felony” is broader than ever, covering some 
twenty categories and hundreds of offenses.133  
That is not to say, however, that an aggravated felony for immigration purposes 
necessarily correlates to a conviction for a serious or violent crime. Indeed, it does 
not even guarantee that the person was convicted of a felony.134 A person with only 
misdemeanor convictions can be considered an aggravated felon. As just one 
example of many, misdemeanor theft of a videogame valued at approximately ten 
dollars can make someone an aggravated felon for immigration purposes.135 
Further, the INA’s broad definition of conviction captures criminal cases that result 
in deferred adjudications and suspended sentences via rehabilitative statutes that 
later erase the record of guilt.136 As a result, drug treatment and domestic violence 
alternative-to-incarceration programs, which frequently vacate pleas after the 
program is completed, and expunged convictions count forever and always as 
convictions for immigration purposes.137 This makes it possible for someone 
without a criminal record to be considered an aggravated felon for immigration 
purposes.  
The aggravated felony provision is not the only good moral character bar in the 
INA. Many crimes that do not fall within the broad “aggravated felony” definition 
still trigger a bar to a good moral character finding for a certain number of years.138  
                                                                                                                 
 
 133. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006) (listing such crimes as murder, drug trafficking, 
money laundering, and theft offenses).  
 134. Historically, in criminal law, the term “felony” distinguished certain “high crimes” 
or “grave offenses” like homicide from less serious offenses known as misdemeanors. As 
currently used, a felony is any crime punishable by incarceration of more than one year in 
prison. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(3) (defining felony as an offense punishable by more 
than one year in prison); id. § 3559(a)(1)–(8) (classifying offenses punishable by more than 
one year in prison as felonies and those punishable by one year or less in prison as 
misdemeanors). 
 135. See United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that 
“Congress can make the word ‘misdemeanor’ mean ‘felony’” by classifying misdemeanor 
shoplifting convictions for which an individual received a one year suspended sentence as 
“aggravated felonies” for immigration purposes); United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 
788 (3d Cir. 1999) (Congress “improvidently, if not inadvertently, [broke] the historic line of 
division between felonies and misdemeanors”). 
 136. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 224 (1996) (Conf. 
Rep.) (“[E]ven in cases where adjudication is ‘deferred,’ the original finding or confession of 
guilt is sufficient to establish a ‘conviction’ for purposes of the immigration laws.”). 
 137. See Roldan, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512 (B.I.A. 1999) (holding that no effect is to be given 
in immigration proceedings to a state action which expunges, dismisses, cancels, vacates, 
discharges, or otherwise removes a guilty plea or other record of guilt or conviction by 
operation of a state rehabilitative statute). 
 138. For example, a conviction or admission to the following bars a good moral character 
finding for up to five years: any controlled substance offense (except a single offense of 
simple possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana); any crime involving moral turpitude 
except for a single offense not punishable by one or more years and that does not involve a 
prison sentence of more than six months (see Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 225 (B.I.A. 1980) 
(defining “crime involving moral turpitude” as “conduct which is morally reprehensible and 
intrinsically wrong”)); two offenses of any type and an aggregate prison sentence of five or 
more years; two gambling offenses; and confinement to jail for aggregate period of 180 
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A host of acts committed during the statutory period also trigger a finding of no 
good moral character, including willfully failing or refusing to support dependents 
and having an extramarital affair that tends to destroy an existing marriage.139 
Of course, none of these bars is necessary for USCIS to deny citizenship on 
character grounds. As the catch-all provision in 101(f) states, “[t]he fact that any 
person is not within any of the foregoing classes shall not preclude a finding that 
for other reasons such a person is or was not of good moral character.”140 As will 
be discussed in Part II, USCIS frequently uses this provision to deny naturalization 
to applicants with minor criminal histories. 
In sum, by requiring good moral character only during the residency period, 
Congress inserted a background belief in the possibility of redemption from past 
wrongs into U.S. membership law. No criminal act barred a good moral character 
finding for any applicant until 1952, when the lone exception of murder was made 
a permanent bar. Consistent with this, courts and naturalization examiners 
traditionally applied a forward-looking standard that recognized reform following 
past wrongs. In the last twenty years, immigration law has added thousands of 
permanent statutory bars to a good moral character finding, including those 
triggered by minor offenses. As a result, the INA prevents or hinders a greater 
number of immigrants than ever from proving their present good moral character.  
II. THE SHADOWS OF MEMBERSHIP 
This Part examines how the statutory provisions regarding good moral character 
and current USCIS practices regarding naturalization applications deny citizenship 
to legal permanent residents with criminal histories and force them to live in the 
shadows of membership. It identifies three groups of affected residents. Part II.A 
explains how statutory relief from deportation interacts with the good moral 
character bar to create a class of half-welcome resident immigrants who can neither 
be deported nor naturalize. Part II.B shows that USCIS training, direction, and 
adjudication result in wrongful denials on character grounds for those applicants 
with criminal history. Part II.C identifies a group of wary residents who forgo 
pursuing citizenship because truthfully disclosing past misdeeds creates too great a 
risk of detention or deportation.  
A. Half Welcome 
The INA makes noncitizens deportable for a whole host of postentry criminal 
conduct.141 From 2001 to 2010, the United States deported over one million people 
                                                                                                                 
days. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2) (2004). 
 139. See 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3). 
 140. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). 
 141. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(iv) (individuals can be charged 
as removable for conduct that would be a crime even if they have not been convicted of a 
crime); Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secretary Napolitano 
Announces Record-Breaking Immigration Enforcement Statistics Achieved Under the 
Obama Administration (Oct. 6, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. Immigration Press Release] (noting 
that half of those removed in fiscal year 2010—more than 195,000 individuals—were 
convicted criminals and boasted that this represented a “more than 70 percent increase . . . 
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with criminal convictions.142 In some instances, individuals can seek relief from 
removal under immigration law and be welcomed to stay permanently in the United 
States.143 Winning such relief often depends on proof that the applicant is a 
valuable, contributing member of society, with many and deep ties to America.144 
Each year, approximately 30,000 individuals are granted relief from removal.145 
Nevertheless, many remain permanently barred by statute from demonstrating that 
they possess the good moral character required for citizenship. I call these 
individuals the “half welcome,” because they are allowed to make the United States 
their permanent home despite their transgressions but are not able to become 
citizens.  
Understanding how the INA puts them in that situation requires background 
information on removal law and the various relief provisions available. What is 
popularly known as “deportation,” the INA calls “removal.”146 Removal 
proceedings begin when the government asserts that a noncitizen is either 
inadmissible or deportable on at least one of many possible grounds,147 including a 
criminal conviction.148 A long list of convictions, from serious, violent felonies to 
minor misdemeanors like shoplifting, can lead to deportation.149 In an 
ever-increasing number of cases, most notably those involving what immigration 
law calls aggravated felonies,150 removal based on a conviction is mandatory—that 
is, immigration law offers no relief. The broadened scope of removal provisions 
                                                                                                                 
from the previous administration”); U.S. Deportation Proceedings in Immigration Courts,  
TRACIMMIGRATION (2012), http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/charges/deport_filing 
_charge.php (charting deportation proceedings by charge, and noting that in fiscal year 2009 
and 2010, approximately 40,000 individuals faced removal for criminal charges). 
 142. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, 2010 
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 101 tbl.38 (2011). 
 143. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 144. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 145. Immigration Court Processing Time by Outcome, TRACIMMIGRATION (2012), 
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/court_proctime_outcome.php 
(charting the number of individuals granted relief from removal back to 1998, with an 
average of approximately 30,000 grants of relief per year since 2003). 
 146. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (regarding removal proceedings).  
 147. Inadmissibility applies to those who have not been lawfully admitted; deportability 
applies to those who have been lawfully admitted to the United States. THOMAS ALEXANDER 
ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA & MARYELLEN FULLERTON, 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 583 (7th ed. 2011). For grounds of 
inadmissibility, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a); for grounds of deportability, see id. § 1227(a). 
 148. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (listing offense that trigger deportability). A conviction is 
not necessary for removal charges. If an individual admits or is found to have engaged in 
conduct that would be a crime, he can be charged as removable for such conduct absent a 
conviction. See 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(iv) (2010).  
 149. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (listing offenses, including those classified as aggravated 
felonies, that trigger deportability); United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 
2000) (“Congress can make the word ‘misdemeanor’ mean ‘felony’” by classifying 
misdemeanor shoplifting convictions for which an individual received a one year suspended 
sentence as “aggravated felonies” for immigration purposes).  
 150. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (listing offenses that constitute an aggravated felony). 
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has taken on added importance recently as the Obama administration has prioritized 
criminal-record-based removals.151 
Immigration authorities primarily learn of a noncitizen’s criminal history in two 
ways. First, they conduct background checks at nearly every stage of the 
immigration process.152 Noncitizens seeking admission to the United States, and 
those who apply to renew their lawful status or naturalize, must provide 
information about their criminal history. Alternatively, the Secure Communities 
Initiative and the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) identify noncitizens in criminal 
custody who are subject to removal as a result of their convictions.153 
In removal proceedings, which are conducted before an administrative judge, 
individuals may seek relief from removal under various provisions in the INA.154 
This relief is separate and apart from challenging the grounds of removal—that is, 
even if found to be removable, an individual may have that removal waived and be 
allowed to remain lawfully in the country.155 Relief from removal is granted at the 
discretion of the immigration judge,156 and reflects the belief that, despite these 
                                                                                                                 
 
 151. See Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t Homeland Sec. to ICE 
Employees (June 30, 2010) (establishing those who pose a “risk to national security or 
danger to public safety” as “priority one”). An ICE press release noted that half of those 
removed in fiscal year 2010—more than 195,000 individuals—were convicted criminals and 
boasted that this represented a “more than 70 percent increase . . . from the previous 
administration.” U.S. Immigration Press Release, supra note 141. In fiscal year 2009, the 
Office of Immigration Statistics reported that the United States removed 128,345 persons 
with a criminal conviction. 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 77, at 
103. To put the increase in broader historical perspective, in 1983, the United States 
deported 863 people on criminal grounds. See Manuel D. Vargas, Immigration 
Consequences of Guilty Pleas or Convictions, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 701, 707 
(2006). Indeed, until 1907, there were no postadmission crime-based grounds of deportation. 
See Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1714 (2009) (citing 
Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 898, 900). 
 152. See 8 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (requiring a personal investigation of naturalization 
applicants that the Attorney General may waive); Manzoor v. Chertoff, 472 F. Supp. 2d 801, 
809 (E.D. Va. 2007); Fingerprinting Applicants and Petitioners for Immigration Benefits; 
Establishing a Fee for Fingerprinting by the Service; Requiring Completion of Criminal 
Background Checks Before Final Adjudication of Naturalization Applications, 63 Fed. Reg. 
12,979, 12,981 (Mar. 17, 1998) (amending the administrative regulations to codify “[INS] 
policy that [INS] must receive confirmation from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
that a full criminal background check has been completed on applicants for naturalization 
before final adjudication of the application”). 
 153. According to ICE, CAP issued over 200,000 charging documents to noncitizens in 
fiscal year 2010, while Secure Communities resulted in the arrest of more than 59,000 
individuals in fiscal year 2010. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, at 3 (2011); U.S. Immigration Press Release, supra note 141 
(noting that the Secure Communities initiative expanded from fourteen jurisdictions in 2008 
to over 660 in the fall of 2010, with plans to expand it to every law enforcement jurisdiction 
nationwide by 2013).  
 154. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (discussed infra notes 160–61 and accompanying text).  
 155. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (allowing for the discretionary cancellation of 
removal for those who are found to be deportable in certain circumstances).  
 156. The sole exception is withholding of removal under INA section 241(b)(3)—which 
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noncitizens’ prior crimes, they could be an integral and integrated part of American 
society.  
The requirements for the various forms of relief can be quite complex. The 
waivable removal grounds vary from section to section, the period of residence 
required for eligibility differs, and some individual deportation grounds have their 
own specific waiver provisions. What follows is a brief overview of three forms of 
relief from removal for those with criminal convictions and an explanation of how 
the INA nevertheless denies a path to citizenship to those granted relief.157 
1. Certain Criminal Offenses: INA 212(h) and Former 212(c) 
Two provisions of the INA make relief available to individuals with certain 
criminal convictions. Former INA section 212(c) provides discretionary relief 
(“212(c) waiver”) to lawful permanent residents who either temporarily leave the 
country and are excludable upon their return, or who have never left but are 
charged with deportability.158 Each case is judged on its own merits and both 
adverse and positive factors are considered.159 Under section 212(h), an 
immigration judge can waive certain grounds of inadmissibility160 when the 
applicant proves (1) that she has rehabilitated from a conviction that is fifteen years 
old or more,161 or (2) that her removal would cause extreme hardship to a U.S. 
citizen or legal permanent resident parent, spouse, or child.162 To be eligible, the 
applicant must have lived in the United States for seven consecutive years.163 
                                                                                                                 
is mandatory provided that the applicant prove his or her life or freedom would be threatened 
in the proposed country of removal on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).  
 157. These provisions do not cover all the situations whereby an individual is granted 
legal permanent resident status but cannot naturalize. For example, someone may receive a 
visa, as a victim of physical or mental abuse, and adjust to legal permanent resident status, or 
adjust under the Violence Against Women Act. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(U). That person could still 
be barred from naturalizing because of a criminal conviction that prevents a finding of good 
moral character. 
 158. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 294–95 (2001). 
 159. In re Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584–85 (B.I.A. 1978). 
 160. A section 212(h) waiver can waive the following crimes: crimes of moral turpitude 
except murder or torture; prostitution; one offense of simple possession of thirty grams or 
less of marijuana; and two or more offenses for which the aggregate sentences to 
confinement were five years or more. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Relevant factors for extreme 
hardship include the relative’s family ties to the United States; the extent of ties outside the 
United States; conditions in the country of removal; financial impact of departure from this 
country; and significant health conditions.  
 161. Id. § 1182(h)(1)(A). Courts consider many factors when examining rehabilitation, 
including: (1) acceptance of responsibility for criminal conduct; (2) guilty pleas; (3) 
educational efforts; (4) lack of infractions while imprisoned; (5) absence of commission of 
additional crimes; (6) participation in rehabilitation programs; and (7) letters regarding good 
character. See Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1372 n.19 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Arreguin 
de Rodriguez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 38 (B.I.A. 1995). 
 162. While a 212(h) waiver is unavailable to a person admitted as a legal permanent 
resident who is later convicted of an aggravated felony, a nonlegal permanent resident (such 
as an undocumented immigrant) with an aggravated felony conviction may receive a 212(h) 
waiver. See In re Michel, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1101, 1101 (B.I.A. 1998). But see Martinez v. 
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Relief under either provision is difficult to achieve.164 The burden is on the 
applicant to establish both eligibility and that the court should exercise its 
discretion and grant the waiver.165 Favorable considerations include family, 
property, and business ties in the United States; long residence in the country; 
service in the U.S. Armed Forces; and evidence of good character and rehabilitation 
if a criminal record exists. 166 Relief is highly unlikely in cases involving “violent 
or dangerous crimes, except in extraordinary circumstances”167 because a 
“heightened showing that [the] case presents unusual or outstanding equities” is 
required.168 If relief is granted, the applicant retains legal permanent resident status 
or obtains that status.169 
Congress eliminated eligibility for relief under section 212(c) in 1990 for those 
convicted of an aggravated felony who had served five years in prison.170 It then 
repealed section 212(c) entirely in 1996.171 Relief under section 212(c) remains 
available, however, to a dwindling number of legal permanent residents convicted 
by a plea entered prior to April 1, 1997.172 Currently, approximately one thousand 
                                                                                                                 
Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 546 (5th Cir. 2008), as amended (June 5, 2008) (stating that for 
those legal permanent residents who adjust postentry to legal permanent resident status, 
section 212(h)’s plain language demonstrates unambiguously Congress’s intent not to bar 
them from seeking a waiver despite aggravated felony conviction). 
 163. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).  
 164. Caselaw granting a 212(h) waiver based on the rehabilitation prong is nearly non-
existent. My research has not yet found a single case granting a 212(h) waiver under the 
rehabilitation prong, perhaps because an immigration judge’s finding of absence of 
rehabilitation is not reviewable. See Al-Shahin v. Holder, 354 F. App’x 583, 583 (2d Cir. 
2009) (denying to reconsider immigration judge’s denial of 212(h) waiver because finding 
was not reviewable). 
 165. In re Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. DEC. 581, 587 (B.I.A 1978). 
 166. In re Mendez-Moralez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 296, 301 (B.I.A. 1996). Adverse factors 
include “the nature and underlying circumstances of the exclusion ground at issue, the 
presence of additional significant violations of this country's immigration laws, the existence 
of a criminal record and, if so, its nature, recency and seriousness, and the presence of other 
evidence indicative of an alien's bad character or undesirability as a permanent resident of 
this country.” Id. 
 167. 8 C.F.R. 212.7(d) (2010). 
 168. Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 169. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 295 (2001). 
 170. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 511, 104 Stat. 4978, 5052. 
 171. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, sec. 304, § 204B(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-597.  
 172. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 294–95 (2001). For current eligibility requirements, 
see 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3. The Immigration Act of 1990 amended section 212(c) to ban 
aggravated felons from relief under section 212(c) if they had served a term of imprisonment 
of at least five years. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 511, 104 Stat. at 
5052. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) further 
amended section 212(c) by reducing the class of legal permanent residents eligible for relief 
from removal. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277. Section 440(d) 
of the AEDPA made the following ineligible for relief under 212(c): (1) aggravated felons; 
(2) those convicted of certain controlled substance offenses; (3) those convicted of firearm 
offenses; (4) those convicted of certain miscellaneous crimes;, and (5) those convicted of 
multiple “crimes involving moral turpitude.” See AEDPA, § 440(d), 110 Stat. at 1277. 
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lawful residents annually demonstrate that their ties, value and service to the 
community, and genuine rehabilitation are so overwhelming that relief is granted 
under 212(c) and they are welcomed as permanent residents.173 Consider, for 
example, Courtney Donaldson, who legally entered the United States from Jamaica 
at the age of fourteen.174 In 1990, at the age of nineteen, he was found guilty of 
possession of marijuana.175 The court granted him deferred adjudication and, in 
1991, placed him on probation for ten years.176 Three and a half years later, the 
court dismissed the case and discharged Mr. Donaldson from probation.177 In 1997, 
Mr. Donaldson applied for naturalization.178 The INS denied his application on the 
basis that his conviction, which constituted an aggravated felony, statutorily barred 
him from ever demonstrating the requisite good moral character.179 Not only that, 
the government initiated removal proceedings against him based on his 
conviction.180 Mr. Donaldson requested and was granted a 212(c) waiver of 
deportation, in part because he was married to a U.S. citizen, with whom he had 
two citizen children; attended church with his family; had been steadily employed 
since 1989; paid his taxes; and had no further arrests or convictions.181 The waiver 
permitted him to remain in the United States as a legal resident for the rest of his 
adult life, but he remains barred from ever naturalizing because his conviction 
triggers the permanent aggravated felon character bar.182 
Another example involves Catalina Arreguin de Rodriguez, who was convicted 
in 1993 of importing marijuana into the United States.183 She was forty years old at 
the time and had been residing in the United States since 1970.184 It was her first 
                                                                                                                 
Section 304(b) of IIRIRA repealed section 212(c), effective April 1, 1997. IIRIRA, § 304, 
110 Stat. at 3009-586. . 
 173. After a bump in the number of people granted relief under former 212(c) following 
St. Cyr, the numbers have shrunk. In fiscal year (FY) 2006, 1437 individuals were granted a 
212(c) waiver, 1405 in FY 2007, 1049 in FY 2008, 857 in FY 2009, 859 in FY 2010, and 
892 in FY 2011. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2010 
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK R3 tbl.15 (2011) [hereinafter FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK]; 
EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2011 STATISTICAL 
YEARBOOK R3 tbl.16 (2012) [hereinafter FY 2011 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK]. A downward 
trend is likely to continue. 
 174. Donaldson v. Acosta, 163 Fed. App’x 261, 262 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 263. 
 180. Id. at 262. 
 181. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at *1, Donaldson v. United States 
Citizneship & Immigration Services, No. H 04 0911 (S.D. Texas 2004), 2004 WL 3722503, 
aff’d  sub nom Donaldson v. Acosta, 163 Fed. App’x 261 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 182. When Mr. Donaldson filed a second naturalization application in 2001, more than a 
decade after his lone conviction as a teenager for possession of marijuana, he was denied 
again, because his conviction forever barred him from demonstrating good moral character. 
See Donaldson, 163 Fed. App’x at 263. 
 183. In re Arreguin de Rodriguez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 38, 39 (B.I.A. 1995). 
 184. See id. at 38–39. 
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and only conviction.185 She was incarcerated and removal proceedings were 
initiated against her.186 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) overturned the 
immigration judge’s denial of a 212(c) waiver, crediting Ms. Arreguin de 
Rodriguez’s efforts at rehabilitation during her incarceration, as well as her nearly 
twenty years of lawful permanent residence in the United States and her five U.S. 
citizen children.187 Despite her long permanent residence, which the BIA called an 
“unusual or outstanding equity,”188 Ms. Arreguin de Rodriguez cannot ever 
naturalize because her drug conviction is an aggravated felony and prevents her 
from establishing her good moral character.  
Countless others find themselves in a similar limbo—welcome to stay, despite 
their past crimes, because of their demonstrated ties and rehabilitation, but unable 
to become full members of their community. 
2. 209(c)—Adjustment of Status for Refugees/Asylees 
Each year, the United States takes in tens of thousands of asylees and 
refugees.189 A grant of refugee status or asylum does not automatically confer 
lawful permanent resident status. To become a lawful permanent resident, asylees 
and refugees must apply for adjustment of status under INA section 209.190 To be 
eligible for adjustment, a person must, among other things, be admissible.191 
Criminal convictions obtained after a grant of asylum, but before filing an 
application for adjustment, can make someone inadmissible.192 Section 209(c) of 
the INA allows for a waiver of certain grounds of inadmissibility.193 In adjudicating 
a waiver application, the applicant’s equities are balanced against the seriousness of 
the criminal offense that made her inadmissible.194 
                                                                                                                 
 
 185. Id. at 42. 
 186. See id. at 39. 
 187. Evidence of her efforts toward rehabilitation included her acceptance of 
responsibility for her crime, her pursuit of further education while in prison, her exemplary 
disciplinary record in prison, and her participation in a church ministry. Id. at 40. 
 188. Id. at 41. 
 189. In 2009, the United States admitted 74,602 persons as refugees and granted asylum 
to 22,119 individuals. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
ANNUAL FLOW REPORT, REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2009 (2010). There is no content 
distinction between the two statuses. The refugee application is made outside of the United 
States prior to entry while asylum is available to those already in the United States. 
 190. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (2006). 
 191. Id. § 1159(b)(5). The other things are (1) be physically present in United States for 
more than one year after being granted asylum; (2) continue to be a “refugee” under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42)(A); and (3) not “firmly resettled” in any foreign country. Id. § 1159(b). 
 192. See In re K-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 661, 662 (B.I.A. 2004).  
 193. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (granting waiver “for humanitarian purposes, to assure 
family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest”). Refugees and asylees are unique 
noncitizens because they have no home country they can safely return to. Adjusting their 
immigration status to legal permanent resident allows them to take an important (and 
required) step on the path to becoming an American citizen. 
 194. See In re Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. 373, 383 (A.G. 2002) (noting that those who commit 
violent or dangerous crimes must show that denial of adjustment to legal permanent resident 
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For example, removal proceedings were brought against a Cambodian refugee 
who was convicted by plea of second-degree robbery and sentenced to three to six 
years in prison.195 An en banc panel of the BIA upheld an immigration judge’s 
grant of a 209(c) waiver to her, noting her four U.S. citizen children, a legal 
resident husband, her remorse for her prior actions, and over fifteen years of 
residence in the United States.196 From that, the BIA concluded that her “conviction 
is not indicative of her overall character and that she is a person who would be an 
asset to our society.”197 Nevertheless, her conviction makes her an aggravated 
felon, and the INA permanently bars her from becoming a citizen.198 
In sum, the same statute that affords relief from removal to individuals with a 
criminal record, and grants them lawful permanent resident status, shuts the door to 
full membership. It does so even though a judge has recognized their ties to the 
community, credited their rehabilitation, and welcomed them to stay permanently 
in the United States. While there is undeniable humanitarianism behind these 
waiver provisions, Part III, below, explains the significant drawbacks to 
permanently denying these residents an opportunity to become citizens.  
B. Denied on Character Grounds 
Immigrants who apply for naturalization do so at the risk of triggering removal 
proceedings against them.199 The sweeping changes in immigration law, described 
above, have made many crimes, which did not previously carry the consequence of 
deportation, grounds for removal. In addition, many immigrants, who were not 
removable at the time they committed or admitted to a crime, may now be 
deportable for that conduct.200  
This section examines what happens to those with criminal history who apply to 
naturalize. First, it looks at those whose criminal history statutorily bars them from 
showing the necessary good moral character, and discusses a USCIS policy 
                                                                                                                 
would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, and even that might not be 
enough). It is unlikely that an individual with an aggravated felony conviction would apply 
for adjustment, because the upside (becoming a legal permanent resident) does not come 
close to the downside (being placed in removal proceedings and deported). However, the 
waiver would be sought if removal proceedings were initiated. 
 195. In re H-N-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1039, 1049–50 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 196. Id. at 1045. 
 197. Id. But see In re Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 382 (finding the majority opinion in H-N- 
upholding the grant of a 209(c) waiver “to be wholly unconvincing”). 
 198. See 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(g) (2006) (identifying any theft offense for which the 
term of imprisonment is more than one year as an aggravated felony). 
 199. The same risk lies for those who apply to adjust their status, and most of the 
practices discussed in this Article apply to those who seek to adjust their status to legal 
permanent resident. For example, an asylee who seeks to adjust her status to legal permanent 
resident can trigger removal proceedings by submitting her application if she has a criminal 
conviction since her arrival.  
 200. Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process 
Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 97 (1998). Some immigrants plead guilty without being aware 
that their plea subjects them to deportation. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1473 
(2010) (holding that noncitizens can base an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the 
failure to inform of the immigration consequences of a plea bargain). 
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memorandum that directs naturalization examiners to issue removal charging 
documents against applicants “who appear to be removable” or refer them to ICE 
for possible detention and removal. Second, it discusses those who are not per se 
barred but are denied on character grounds via the agency’s exercise of discretion. 
1. Statutorily Barred and Referred Removal 
The story of Qing Hong Wu illustrates the precarious process currently faced by 
naturalization applicants with a criminal history. Mr. Wu legally immigrated to the 
United States from China with his parents at the age of five.201 In 1995, at the age 
of fifteen, he committed several muggings, with other teenagers in Manhattan; 
received two convictions for robbery in adult court; and was sentenced to three to 
nine years at a reformatory. Good behavior earned his release after three years. 
From there, he supported his mother by working, moving his way up from data 
entry clerk to vice president for internet technology at a national company. A dozen 
years after his convictions, engaged to be married to a U.S. citizen, Mr. Wu applied 
for citizenship, disclosing in his application his robbery convictions. He had no 
other contact with the criminal justice system and was lauded by family, friends, 
and coworkers as a hard-working, upstanding member of the community.  
Under immigration law, Mr. Wu’s convictions are aggravated felonies, making 
him statutorily unable to demonstrate his current good moral character and, thus, 
permanently ineligible for citizenship.202 Instead of denying his application, USCIS 
transferred Mr. Wu’s case to ICE (the agency responsible for immigration 
enforcement), he was promptly placed in federal detention as a criminal alien, and 
mandatory removal proceedings were initiated against him. Remarkably for Mr. 
Wu, public outcry and media attention led New York’s governor to pardon Mr. 
Wu, and just two months later, his application was granted and he was sworn in as 
an American citizen.203 In so doing, Governor Paterson noted that “Qing Hong 
Wu’s case proves that an individual can, with hard work and dedication, rise above 
past mistakes and turn his life around.”204 The criminal court judge who had 
originally sentenced Mr. Wu for his youthful robberies, and who supported his 
                                                                                                                 
 
 201. For details of Mr. Wu’s story, see Nina Bernstein, After Governor’s Pardon, an 
Immigrant Is Sworn in as a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2010, at A20 [hereinafter 
Bernstein, After Governor’s Pardon]; Nina Bernstein, Judge Keeps Word to Immigrant Who 
Kept His, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2010, at A1 [hereinafter Bernstein, Judge Keeps Word]; Nina 
Bernstein, Paterson Rewards Redemption with a Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2010, at A29 
[hereinafter Bernstein, Paterson Rewards]. 
 202. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(g) (identifying any theft offense for which the term of 
imprisonment is more than one year as an aggravated felony). 
 203. See Bernstein, After Governor’s Pardon, supra note 201; Bernstein, Paterson 
Rewards, supra note 201. Mr. Wu’s pardon petition was supported by his sentencing judge, 
family, friends, and employers, the New York City District Attorney, the Police Benevolent 
Association, and several Chinese, Asian, Pan Asian, and immigrant organizations from 
across the country. Bernstein, Judge Keeps Word, supra 201. 
 204. Bernstein, Paterson Rewards, supra note 201.  
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pardon petition, called the end result “truly a magnificent affirmation of American 
values and justice.”205 
The result in Mr. Wu’s case is a just one, welcoming to the citizenry someone 
who residents and leaders consider a valuable and contributing member of the 
community. But his story also serves as an indictment of current naturalization 
policy. It should not require the extraordinary remedy of an executive pardon206 to 
open a path to membership for people like Mr. Wu. Frustrated because it does, 
Governor Paterson announced not long after the Wu case’s resolution that New 
York would convene a special Immigration Pardon Panel that would accelerate the 
consideration of pardon petitions filed by legal immigrants for old or minor 
criminal convictions, with the aim of preventing them from being deported.207 
Paterson said that “some of our immigration laws . . . are embarrassingly and 
wrongly inflexible. . . . In New York we believe in renewal. . . . In New York, we 
believe in rehabilitation.”208 In a press release announcing the panel’s first pardons, 
Governor Paterson declared: 
That immigration officials do not credit rehabilitation, nor account for 
human suffering is adverse to the values that our country 
represents . . . . I have selected cases that exemplify the values of New 
York State and that of a just society: atonement, forgiveness, 
compassion, realism, open arms, and not retribution, punitiveness and a 
refusal to acknowledge the worth of immigration.209 
Of course, not all immigrants with a criminal record subjecting them to 
deportation are as fortunate as Mr. Wu or the thirty-four immigrants in New York 
who received a pardon from Governor Paterson.210 For immigrants across the 
nation with a criminal record, applying for naturalization brings potential or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 205. Bernstein, After Governor’s Pardon, supra note 201. 
 206. At the time, Mr. Wu’s was only the twelfth pardon granted by New York since 
1973. See Kirk Semple, Hip-Hopper Is Pardoned by Governor, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2008, 
at B1; New York Clemency Decisions, NEW YORK STATE DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION 
http://www.nysda.org/html/clemency.html (listing New York clemency decisions since 
1995). This is part of a national pattern. The percentage of federal clemency applications 
granted has declined sharply in recent decades. Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the 
Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1348 (2008).  
 207. Danny Hakim & Nina Bernstein, New Paterson Policy May Reduce Deportations, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010, at A1; see also Elizabeth Rapaport, The Georgia Immigration 
Pardons: A Case Study in Mass Clemency, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 184 (2000–01). 
 208. Hakim & Bernstein, supra note 207. 
 209. Press Release, Governor Paterson Announces Pardons (Dec 6, 2010) [hereinafter 
Press Release, Governor Paterson]. All told, Governor Paterson granted twenty-four pardons 
to immigrants facing deportation for their crimes. Celeste Katz, Gov. Paterson Grants 24 
Pardons to Immigrants, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 24, 2010), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2010/12/gov-paterson-grants-24-pardons-
to-immigrants; Press Release, Governor Paterson, supra. 
 210. Some may argue that the system works just as it should, reserving for the 
extraordinary cases the grant of an executive pardon. But New York is just one state of fifty, 
and Governor Paterson is already out of office there. 
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mandatory banishment instead of membership. While USCIS does not publish data 
on how many naturalization applicants it refers to ICE, anecdotal reports from 
practitioners support the fact that it happens quite frequently.211  
An internal agency memo shows that the original course of Mr. Wu’s case (from 
naturalization applicant to removal charges) is precisely what the agency wants. On 
July 11, 2006, Associate Director for Domestic Operations of USCIS, Michael 
Aytes, issued “Policy Memorandum No. 110: Disposition of Cases Involving 
Removable Aliens” (“Aytes Memo”).212 The internal USCIS memo prioritizes the 
removal of individuals by ICE over the adjudication of naturalization petitions by 
instructing immigration service officers (ISOs) to filter out naturalization applicants 
with a criminal record and refer them for removal proceedings.213 While the Aytes 
Memo is not classified, it is an interoffice memo stamped “for office use only,” 
written to agency directors and chiefs, and was not intended for public view.214 
The Aytes Memo categorizes naturalization applicants215 with arrests or 
criminal histories into five groups.216 I will focus on applicants who fall under the 
memo’s “Egregious Public Safety Cases” (EPSC) category because the memo 
directs that they be referred directly and immediately to ICE for determinations of 
removability.217 EPSC is a term of art that covers any case where an applicant “is 
under investigation for, has been arrested for (without disposition), or has been 
convicted of” one of ten categories of conduct listed in the memo.218 The Aytes 
                                                                                                                 
 
 211. See Letter from The Legal Aid Society of New York, Immigration Law Unit, to 
Alejandro Mayorkas, Director, USCIS 1, 12 (May 24, 2010) (copy on file with author) 
[hereinafter LAS Letter] (describing “the placement of a substantial and increasing number 
of naturalization applicants into removal proceedings” and describing a long-time lawful 
permanent resident who was arrested at his naturalization interview and charged with 
removal in 2009 due to a twenty-six-year-old conviction for possession of a weapon in the 
fourth degree). 
 212. Memorandum from Michael Aytes, Associate Director, Domestic Services, U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigration Services, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Disposition of Cases 
Involving Removable Aliens to National Security & Records Verification (July 11, 2006) 
[hereinafter Aytes Memo]. 
 213. Id. at 4. 
 214. Id. 
 215. The Memo’s directives apply not just to naturalization petitions but to all cases 
where USCIS is making an adjudication, such as applications for permanent residence. Id. 
 216. The five groups are: (1) egregious public safety cases, (2) other criminal cases, (3) 
cases where the Notice to Appear (NTA) is prescribed by regulation, (4) cases denied by 
USCIS based on fraud, and (5) all other cases. Id. at 2–7. 
 217. Id. at 2. 
 218. The ten categories are: (1) murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor; (2) illicit 
trafficking in firearms or destructive devices; (3) offenses relating to explosive materials or 
firearms; (4) crimes of violence for which the term of imprisonment imposed or where the 
penalty for a pending case is at least one year; (5) offenses relating to the demand for or 
receipt of ransom; (6) child pornography; (7) offenses relating to peonage, slavery, 
involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons; (8) offenses related to alien smuggling; (9) 
human rights violators, known or suspected street gang members, or Interpol hits; and (10) 
re-entry after an order of exclusion, deportation or removal subsequent to a conviction for a 
felony where permission to reapply for permission has not been granted. Id. at 2–3. 
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Memo directs USCIS to refer all EPSC applicants to ICE and either hold in 
abeyance the naturalization application or deny it outright, on the presumption that 
removal will follow the referral.219 This holds even though the ultimate disposition 
of the arrest that makes an applicant an EPSC may not make the individual 
removable from the country. Indeed, the applicant may not have committed the 
alleged act, the applicant may be acquitted, or the charges may be dropped. 
The mandatory referral for removal persists even though there are at least two 
ways that the EPSC definition captures individuals who are eligible to naturalize. 
First, it includes arrestees even though the INA and the regulations on good moral 
character do not include bars for merely suspected activity that the applicant does 
not admit to doing.220 Second, while the INA bars a finding of good moral 
character only for those convicted of an “aggravated felony” after November 29, 
1990, the EPSC definition covers those with “aggravated felony” convictions from 
any time.221 By instructing examiners to deny these applications, the Aytes Memo 
creates per se bars to naturalization that are not found in the INA.  
The agency is so keen on deporting these aspiring citizens that the Aytes Memo, 
for the first time, gave local USCIS district offices the authority to place applicants 
directly into removal proceedings.222 In addition, it encourages ICE to request that 
“USCIS promptly schedule an interview for the purpose of ICE arresting and 
taking the alien into custody[,]” stating that recent cases where people were 
detained at their naturalization interview “demonstrated the effectiveness of this 
strategy.”223 Practitioners have confirmed that USCIS has instructed several of their 
clients to appear for an interview related to their naturalization application, and 
those clients were detained by ICE on arrival.224 
The expansive definition of EPSC in the Aytes Memo means that a significant 
number of individuals who are eligible to naturalize are wrongly denied or are 
detained and placed in removal proceedings before their naturalization application 
is adjudicated. Delio Nunez is just one example.225 Mr. Nunez, who is fifty-one 
                                                                                                                 
 
 219. Id. at 3–5. 
 220. Id. at 3 (“[E]ven without a conviction, an alien may be an egregious public safety 
case . . . .”). 
 221. The Aytes Memo nowhere states a time restriction for triggering offenses. Id. 
 222. See JoJo Annobil, The Immigration Representation Project: Meeting the Critical 
Needs of Low-Wage and Indigent New Yorkers Facing Removal, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 517, 
518 (2009) (“Previously, USCIS immigration service officers (ISOs) only had the authority 
to grant or deny an immigration benefit—such as naturalization or permanent residence—but 
not the authority to commence immigration proceedings against those applicants whose 
cases they had denied.”). Annobil notes that “[i]n fiscal year 2007, USCIS placed 23,211 
applicants in removal proceedings and referred 813 applicants every month to ICE for 
placement into proceedings.” Id. at 518–19. 
 223. Aytes Memo, supra note 212, at 4 & n.7. 
 224. LAS Letter, supra note 211, at 12 (describing long-time lawful permanent resident 
who was arrested by ICE at his naturalization interview in 2009 and placed in removal 
proceedings due to a twenty-six-year-old conviction for possession of a weapon in the fourth 
degree). As the letter notes, because most naturalization applicants are not represented by 
counsel, those cases familiar to attorneys likely only represent the tip of the iceberg. 
 225. See Erica Pearson, Citizen Bid Turns Into Deportation Rap, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 
3, 2010, at 24. 
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years old, came to the United States as a child from the Dominican Republic.226 In 
2007, he applied for citizenship and disclosed that he spent two years in jail in the 
1980s after he pleaded guilty to armed robbery.227 Mr. Nunez eventually received a 
call from an ICE agent telling him that he was being charged with removal and that 
he had to surrender to federal authorities.228 Because Mr. Nunez’s conviction 
occurred prior to 1990, he is not per se barred from demonstrating his current good 
moral character.229 Nevertheless, the conviction makes him removable,230 and the 
Aytes Memo instructs naturalization examiners to refer individuals like Mr. Nunez 
to ICE for removal proceedings. 
This is not a result that the INA demands, nor is it clear that it is the properly 
prioritized result. USCIS promotes naturalization, distributing information via its 
website and elsewhere that highlights the benefits of naturalization and encourages 
immigrants to apply.231 For the same agency to affirmatively use the naturalization 
process as a source for removal candidates contradicts its mission and is 
fundamentally unfair.232 Many who apply for naturalization are long-time residents 
of the United States with citizen family members.233 The mere fact that someone 
applies for citizenship should not place her at a higher risk of removal than 
noncitizens who do not apply to naturalize.  
Singling these individuals out for removal proceedings also poorly allocates 
limited agency resources. Some individuals referred for removal will qualify for 
relief, prevail during their removal proceedings, and seek naturalization again, 
where the result will ultimately be the same had the naturalization application been 
adjudicated completely in the first place. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10 (2010); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGRATION SERVS., ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL ch. 73.6 (2011), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1.html [hereinafter AFM]; 
Amended Definition of “Aggravated Felony” and the Section 101(f)(8) Bar to Good Moral 
Character, Genco Op. No. 96-16, (INS Dec. 3, 1996), at *2, available at 1996 WL 
33166347. 
 230. Armed robbery is an “aggravated felony” that triggers deportability. 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1101(a)(43), 1227(a)(2).  
 231. See, e.g., USCIS, A GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION, supra note 66; Office of 
Citizenship, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgn
extoid=a5e314c0cee47210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=a5e314c0cee4
7210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD. 
 232. For a discussion of agencies who seek to achieve multiple, and sometimes 
conflicting, missions, see Eric Biber, Too Many Things To Do: How to Deal with the 
Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 233. The typical successful naturalization applicant is married, thirty-nine years old, and 
has been a legal permanent resident for at least six years. See JAMES LEE, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGRATION SERVS., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: U.S. NATURALIZATIONS: 2010 4 (2011) 
(noting that 67% of persons naturalized in 2010 were married, and 30% were between the 
ages of 35 and 44). 
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A further impact of removal charges against naturalization applicants is that 
INA section 318 bars consideration of a naturalization application when removal 
proceedings are ongoing.234 Section 318 was enacted to prevent individuals from 
circumventing removal proceedings by applying for naturalization in district court, 
which would serve as a complete defense to removal.235 It therefore stands for the 
proposition that ongoing proceedings should not be interrupted by the initiation of a 
proceeding in another forum. But, for applicants like Qing Hong Wu and Delio 
Nunez, naturalization is not being used as an end-run around removal proceedings 
because they filed the naturalization application first. Yet, because of the Aytes 
Memo, removal proceedings triggered by naturalization applications now halt the 
prior naturalization proceeding. Therefore, the Aytes Memo’s directive to shelve 
naturalization applications and proceed to removal is contrary to the statute. 
2. Discretionary Denials 
This Section demonstrates the intimidating and counterproductive ways that 
USCIS addresses good moral character issues for naturalization applicants whose 
criminal record does not statutorily bar a good moral character finding. It reviews 
the USCIS Adjudicator’s Field Manual (AFM) that instructs examiners in making 
good moral character decisions and concludes that it is essentially a primer on how 
to deny applicants on character grounds. Using actual good moral character denials, 
evidence shows that some examiners are misapplying the law and regulations, and 
consequently, the examiners are erroneously using the good moral character 
requirement to deny naturalization to those with minor criminal backgrounds. 
a. Agency Instruction to Naturalization Examiners 
From 1790 until 1990, exclusive jurisdiction to grant naturalization rested with 
courts.236 In response to increasing naturalization processing backlogs, Congress 
passed the Immigration Act of 1990, which was intended to streamline the 
naturalization process by establishing a system of administrative naturalization.237  
                                                                                                                 
 
 234. 8 U.S.C. § 1429.  
 235. See Shomberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 540, 544 (1955) (Congress enacted section 
318 to end the “race between the alien to gain citizenship and the Attorney General to deport 
him.”). 
 236. The first Naturalization Act entrusted any common law court of record to hear and 
decide a naturalization petition. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, §1, 1 Stat. 103, 103–04 (1790). 
Federal courts were granted concurrent jurisdiction in 1795. See Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 
§ 1, 1 Stat. 414, 414–15 (1795) (allowing a supreme, superior, district, or circuit court of any 
state or territory, or a circuit or district court of the United States, to handle naturalization 
actions). This continued throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See 
Naturalization Act of 1906, ch. 3592, § 3, 34 Stat. 596, 596 (conferring exclusive jurisdiction 
to naturalize aliens as citizens of the United States on specified courts, including United 
States circuit and district courts in any State, and all courts of record in any State or Territory 
having a seal, a clerk, and jurisdiction in actions at law or equity, or law and equity, in which 
the amount in controversy is unlimited.”) 
 237. Pub. L. No. 101-649, sec. 401–08, 104 Stat. 4978, 5038–47 (1990) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
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Effective October 1, 1991, Congress gave the attorney general authority to 
naturalize a citizen without permission from the district court.238 This authority was 
delegated to the executive agency responsible for immigration and naturalization 
matters by regulation.239 Today, that agency is called the United States Citizenship 
and Immigration Services. 
The USCIS AFM is a several hundred-page document that details USCIS 
policies and procedures for adjudicating immigration benefit applications and 
petitions.240 It is a significant information source for ISOs, the USCIS employees 
who review and decide naturalization petitions in the first instance. Chapters 71 
through 76 of the AFM relate to naturalization, with chapter 73.6 devoted 
exclusively to good moral character considerations.241 
The opening paragraph of the AFM chapter on good moral character begins with 
two telling remarks that show how USCIS wants ISOs to approach the character 
issue. The AFM notes that “[a]lthough the law specifies that the good moral 
character requirement applies to the statutory period,” and “[a]lthough the focus 
should be on conduct during the statutory period,” it makes clear that the character 
inquiry “should extend to the applicant’s conduct during his or her entire 
lifetime.”242 The manual notably fails to clarify the rule that examiners cannot rely 
exclusively on pre-period conduct to deny an application on character grounds.243 
Instead, the AFM urges ISOs to “obtain a complete record of any criminal, 
unlawful, or questionable activity in which the applicant has ever engaged, 
regardless of whether such information eventually proves to be material to the 
moral character issue.”244  
After outlining the permanent and conditional character bars to establishing 
good moral character,245 the remaining three-quarters of the chapter fall under the 
subheading “Finding a Lack of Good Moral Character.”246 In it, the AFM teaches 
ISOs how to deny an application on character grounds and how to make sure that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 238. The major change was made by a 1990 statute, which was followed by an 
adjustment in 1991 that slightly enhanced the role of the courts. See id. sec. 401, 104 Stat. at 
5038, amended by Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization 
Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, §§ 101–02, 105 Stat. 1733, 1733–36 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 239. 8 C.F.R. § 310.1 (2010). 
 240. AFM, supra note 229. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at ch. 73.6(a). A grammarian might notice the repeated use of the subordinating 
conjunction “although,” suggesting that the idea in the subordinated clauses (what the law 
specifies and what the focus should be) is less important than the idea in the main clause of 
the sentence (look everywhere for bad character evidence). 
 243. Interpretation 316.1 Naturalization Requirements, INS Interp. Ltr. 316.1 (2001) at 
*14, available at 2001 WL 1333876 (as long as the pre-period conduct is not a post-
November 29, 1990 “aggravated felony”). 
 244. AFM, supra note 229, at ch. 73.6(b). The AFM also reminds ISOs that Congress 
defines “conviction” broadly for immigration purposes to include, among other things, 
expungements. Id. at ch. 73.6(c). 
 245. Id. at ch. 73.6(a)–(c). 
 246. Id. at ch. 73.6(d). 
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such a decision will stand up to a legal challenge.247 It does so primarily by 
presuming that any prior criminal history denotes bad character. For example, if the 
examiner determines that the applicant’s criminal conviction constitutes an 
aggravated felony but that conviction occurred before November 29, 1990, and thus 
does not preclude a good character finding, the AFM teaches examiners how they 
can still deny on character grounds.248 The manual states that the applicant’s 
actions during the statutory period must reflect a reform of character.249 The AFM 
does not explain where this requirement comes from (it is nowhere in the law or 
regulations) and offers no guidance on what reflects reform. It does not, for 
example, instruct ISOs that character references from community members would 
help resolve the inquiry. Nor does it state that a lack of subsequent arrests, by itself, 
reflects positively.250 Instead, it prioritizes the collection of negative evidence about 
the applicant.251 So determined is the agency to find negative information, the AFM 
suggests that ISOs ask applicants the following Kafkaesque questions: “Have you 
ever been in a police station?” and “Have you ever had a record sealed by a judge 
and been told that you did not have to reveal the criminal conduct?”252 
The AFM’s current language contrasts sharply with the agency’s mid-century 
view of the good moral character requirement.253 As mentioned above, the 1944 
Nationality Manual endorsed a decidedly redemptive view toward prior criminal 
conduct. It stated that “Congress undoubtedly intended to provide for the 
reformation of those who have been guilty of past misdeeds”254 and declared that 
the good moral character provision “makes ample allowance for reformation,” so 
much so that it was the service’s position that “[n]otwithstanding that a petitioner 
may have been convicted of murder prior to the statutory period, he may 
nevertheless be in a position to establish good moral character.”255  
The punitive and unforgiving framing of the character inquiry in the AFM 
combined with the Aytes Memo to produce what advocates describe as a growing 
number of naturalization denials on good moral character grounds and 
naturalization applicants placed in removal proceedings.256 
                                                                                                                 
 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at ch. 73.6(d)(3)(A). 
 250. Rashtabadi v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 23 F.3d 1562, 1571 (9th Cir. 
1994) (stating that evidence of no further arrests or convictions is “at least probative of . . . 
rehabilitation” in context of waiver inquiry). 
 251. AFM, supra note 229, at ch. 73.6(b). 
 252. Id. 
 253. See supra Part I.B. 
 254. IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY SERV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONALITY MANUAL: FOR 
THE USE OF OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE § 
773 (1944). 
 255. Id. § 773–74.  
 256. Part of the increase in character-based denials may be a reaction to criticisms aimed 
at the immigration service following the 1995–96 Citizenship USA (CUSA) Initiative. 
CUSA was meant to reduce the backlog of pending naturalization applications, with a goal 
of processing over one million naturalization applicants by the end of 1996. A 2000 Office 
of Inspector General (OIG) report on CUSA concluded that the “integrity of naturalization 
adjudications . . . suffered badly as a result of INS’ efforts to process naturalization 
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b. Good Moral Character Denials 
A look at recent naturalization denials and a deposition of an ISO demonstrate a 
further problem with regard to good moral character determinations: erroneous 
understandings of the applicable law leading to wrongful denials on character 
grounds. Some are wrongful because the examiner thought the denial was 
compelled when it was not, while others are inexplicable. 
Consider the case of Kichul Lee. In 1999, Mr. Lee, a South Korean immigrant, 
received a $152 ticket for collecting three dozen too many oysters along a Puget 
Sound, Washington beach.257 He promptly paid his fine, and several years later 
applied for naturalization.258 He had no contact whatsoever with the criminal 
justice system. USCIS denied his application, stating that Mr. Lee failed to 
establish his good moral character.259 The Washington State Department of Fish 
and Wildlife officer who issued the ticket said that “I wouldn’t consider [the 
infraction] serious at all,” and “[i]t would have been very nice if [the immigration 
officer] had contacted me to discuss the case.”260 But the ISO did not.  
Mr. Lee’s experience is not isolated. So pervasive was the practice of denying 
citizenship based on minor infractions that Lee was the named plaintiff in a class 
action lawsuit against USCIS alleging a policy and practice of unlawfully denying 
naturalization on the basis of minor arrests or criminal convictions and considering 
only negative character evidence.261 The government settled the matter, agreeing to 
improve its citizenship decision-making concerning applicants’ good moral 
character and better train and supervise adjudicators to ensure that they make 
legally proper decisions.262 It also agreed to reopen and reconsider hundreds of 
naturalization applications that were denied for a lack of good moral character 
based on a minor criminal conviction decided by the Seattle, Spokane, and Yakima 
                                                                                                                 
applications more quickly.” OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL 
REPORT: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE’S 
CITIZENSHIP USA INITIATIVE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 (2000). Much of the criticism focused 
on hasty or incomplete criminal background checks that allowed applicants with potentially 
disqualifying criminal histories to be naturalized. See id. at 14–20. In addition, the OIG 
found that the service failed to provide adequate guidance concerning the evaluation of good 
moral character. Id. at 17–18. The upshot of the CUSA outcry was that the agency needed to 
scrutinize much more carefully the criminal backgrounds of naturalization applicants and 
ensure that those who lacked good moral character not be admitted to the citizenry. 
 257. Chris McGann, One Mistake Robs Man of Citizenship: Moral Character Standard 
Challenged in Class Action Suit, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 10, 2004, at A1; 
Lornet Turnbull, Goal of U.S. Citizenship Reached, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 9, 2005, at B1. 
 258. McGann, supra note 257, at A1. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. First Amended Complaint Class Action at ¶ 16, Lee v. Ashcroft, No. C04-449L 
(W.D. Wash. May 4, 2004) (identifying, for example, Plaintiff Sam Ta, who was denied 
citizenship on good moral character grounds on the basis of a violation of the Seattle 
Municipal Code for “a non-violent argument with his then-girlfriend, who was standing 
outside a locked door at the time of the incident”). 
 262. Settlement Agreement, Lee v. Gonzales, No. C04-449-RSL (W.D. Wash. July 10, 
2005).  
1610 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:1571 
 
offices during a specific time period.263 Rejecting USCIS’s austere view of the 
character requirement, the federal judge in the case ordered Lee sworn in as a U.S. 
citizen.264 As a result of the class litigation, at least 158 of those who took 
advantage of the process were also granted naturalization.265 
A more recent case from New York shows that the practice was not confined to 
the Pacific Northwest and has not stopped. Mr. A’s naturalization application was 
denied by the New York office because, within the five-year statutory period 
immediately preceding his application, Mr. A received a traffic ticket for “failure to 
signal” a turn.266 The naturalization examiner decided that, on the basis of that 
ticket, Mr. A lacked the good moral character necessary for citizenship.267 Mr. A 
appealed the denial and was eventually naturalized, though not before he had to 
waste his own, and the agency’s limited, resources in overturning the wrongful 
denial.268 
In other situations, ISOs deny naturalization on character grounds mistakenly 
believing that the applicant is barred from demonstrating good moral character 
when in fact he is not. For example, USCIS denied the naturalization petition of 
Mr. M, a Vietnam veteran whose only criminal blemish was a 1976 court martial 
for selling marijuana while in the armed services.269 The examiner stated that the 
court martial constituted an “aggravated felony,” and someone convicted of an 
“aggravated felony” “at any time” could not demonstrate good moral character.270 
This is simply not the law. The INA, the regulations, the AFM, and an INS general 
counsel opinion letter all state that convictions entered before November 29, 1990, 
that constitute aggravated felonies do not preclude a finding of good moral 
character.271  
A deposition of ISO Eladio Torres illustrates how the miscarriages described 
above can occur. The deposition relates to Mr. Torres’s denial of naturalization to 
Vernon Lawson, a Vietnam veteran who was convicted in 1986 for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 263. The Lee v. Gonzales litigation identified 1213 persons who had been denied on good 
moral character grounds in the Seattle District alone; of which approximately 500 had 
subsequently reapplied and been granted citizenship. Declaration of Michael P. Conricode, 
Lee v. Gonzales, No. C04-449 RSL *7 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 27, 2006).  
 264. Turnbull, supra note 257, at B1. 
 265. Email to author from Robert Gibbs, lead counsel on behalf of plaintiffs in Lee v. 
Gonzalez, (Mar. 4, 2011) (on file with author). 
 266. LAS Letter, supra note 211, at 12. 
 267. Id. 
 268. While justice was done for Mr. A, USCIS never issued a decision on the appeal of 
the naturalization denial; instead, it simply sent Mr. A a notice to attend his swearing-in 
ceremony. As a result, the record is not corrected and ISOs are not educated in the proper 
scope of the character inquiry for naturalization. Id. at 12–13. 
 269. Telephone Interview with Amy Meselson, Legal Aid Soc’y of N.Y. Immigration 
Law Unit (Dec. 22, 2010). 
 270. Id.  
 271. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10 (2010); AFM, supra note 229, at ch. 
73.6; Amended Definition of “Aggravated Felony” and the Section 101(f)(8) Bar to Good 
Moral Character, Genco Op. No. 96-16, (INS Dec. 3, 1996), at *2, available at 1996 WL 
33166347. 
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manslaughter.272 ISO Torres correctly concluded that Mr. Lawson’s conviction 
constituted an “aggravated felony” for immigration purposes.273 He wrongly 
concluded, as did the ISO in Mr. M’s case above, that Mr. Lawson was “precluded 
by [§ 101(f)(8)] of the INA from establishing good moral character because during 
the period for which good moral character is required to be established, you 
remained, or are, one who at any time has been convicted of an aggravated 
felony.”274 When asked about his understanding of the law, Mr. Torres testified that 
he had “come across” information that says a person whose aggravated felony 
conviction is before Nov. 29, 1990, is not precluded from establishing good moral 
character, but said that “[t]he way I read the law, um, I’m not so sure that that’s the 
case.”275 Despite being shown the AFM, section 316.10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, and acknowledging familiarity with an INS General Counsel Opinion 
letter—each of which clearly states that pre-1990 aggravated felonies do not trigger 
the bar—Torres insisted that he read the law differently.276 
The deposition of Mr. Torres betrayed further problems with the way some ISOs 
conduct the character inquiry. As mentioned above, naturalization applicants often 
find themselves in removal proceedings based on criminal history disclosed in their 
applications. While USCIS cannot approve a naturalization application for an 
applicant who is in removal proceedings,277 a removal charge is not the same as a 
removal order. Every day, immigration judges rule that removal charges are 
unfounded or not proven, or they grant relief from removal under various statutory 
relief provisions.278 Indeed, one in four removal cases end either in termination for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 272. Deposition of Eladio Torres, Lawson v. USCIS, No. 09 Civ. 10195 (S.D.N.Y) (July 
14, 2010).  
 273. Id. at 160.  
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. at 57. 
 276. Id. at 200. After Lawson’s administrative appeal was denied by USCIS, he appealed 
to federal court. There, the judge overturned the denial and granted Lawson’s naturalization 
application. Lawson v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. 09 Civ. 10195 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 7, 2011). The court found that USCIS was “plainly wrong in its invocation of the 
statutory bar for an aggravated felony conviction,” a position which the Government did not 
even seek to defend before the federal court. Id. at 32. The court then discussed Lawson’s 
life in the twenty-five years since he committed his crime, and found that Lawson is and has 
been a person of good moral character. Id. at 3. The court noted that “no man is beyond 
redemption” and stated that “the manner in which he has overcome his challenges is a 
testament to his character.” Id. at 37–38. The court further chastised the Government for 
pursuing Lawson’s removal, calling it “mean-spirited at worst and puzzling at best” and 
opining that it “betray[ed] a desire on the part of the Government to continue punishing 
Lawson for his actions of so long ago.” Id. at 41. 
 277. 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (“[N]o application for naturalization shall be considered by the 
Attorney General if there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding . . . .”). 
 278. Through the first six months of fiscal year 2012, 12,560 immigration court 
proceedings were terminated because there were no grounds for removal and another 16,744 
individuals were granted some relief from removal (not including voluntary departure). See 
Immigration Court Processing Time by Outcome, TRACIMMIGRATION (2012), 
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/outcomes.php.  
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lack of grounds for removal or a grant of relief from removal.279 Nevertheless, Mr. 
Torres testified that “when an alien is placed in deportation, removal, it’s an 
indication that his presence as a local permanent resident, or otherwise, is no longer 
desirable in this country. And so, that’s—that’s Congress’s intent. Congress said, 
send this person out of the country.”280 
The view that convictions that make an immigrant removable requires a denial 
of naturalization on character grounds is not limited to those applicants already in 
removal proceedings. Nevertheless, USCIS denied the naturalization petition of 
Mr. O., whose sole 1989 weapon possession conviction is not an aggravated felony, 
concluding pithily that because his conviction constitutes a deportable offense, he 
cannot prove good moral character.281 At the time, Mr. O was not in removal 
proceedings and had no outstanding order of removal against him.282 
What emerges from these examples is that agency personnel tasked with 
adjudicating naturalization applications hold false impressions about the eligibility 
of those with a criminal past. Some naturalization examiners mistakenly believe 
that an aggravated felony conviction from any time precludes a finding of good 
moral character; some mistakenly believe that a conviction for a deportable offense 
precludes a finding of good moral character; and some mistakenly believe that 
pending removal proceedings indicate an incompatibility with membership. In each 
instance, ISOs are getting the law wrong. They are not required to deny a good 
moral character finding in any of those instances. 
These USCIS practices are subverting the statutory and regulatory scheme 
governing naturalization. In ways not required by the INA, and in some instances in 
clear contradiction of the law and congressional intent, removability is trumping 
eligibility for citizenship as the agency uses the naturalization process to effectuate 
removal policies. The expanded deportation provisions, the AFM, the Aytes Memo, 
and misinformed examiners are increasingly preventing naturalization on character 
grounds. Individuals eligible to naturalize, who are encouraged to naturalize by a 
host of laws, policies, and programs, and who Congress meant for adjudicators to 
examine by focusing on their present character, are instead being judged harshly by 
their past misdeeds and placed in removal proceedings. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 279. In FY 2011, over 25,000 immigration court proceedings (11.6% of decisions) were 
terminated because there were no grounds for removal, while another 31,763 individuals 
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C. Scared Citizenship-Less 
A third group of lawful immigrants denied citizenship are those chilled from 
applying. All are eligible to naturalize, in that they meet the statutory requirements 
and are not barred from showing their good moral character. Some are not 
removable under the law, others have persuasive cases for relief should they be 
charged with removability, while some are not eligible for relief. Despite their 
eligibility for naturalization, the fear that old, minor criminal convictions or 
conduct will lead them to the situations faced by Mr. Wu and Mr. Nunez dissuades 
them from applying. I call this group “scared citizenship-less” because the process 
is simply too risky.  
There is no data on the number of eligible people who forgo applying for 
citizenship because the risks are so great. Undoubtedly, some do so because they 
have no defense to removal or lack a compelling case for relief, and do not wish to 
draw attention to their whereabouts. Anecdotal evidence nevertheless supports the 
notion that thousands of long-time permanent residents eligible for naturalization 
choose not to apply. Lawyers in the Legal Aid Society of New York’s Immigration 
Law Unit describe the chilling effect that using naturalization applications to 
identify removal targets has on the pursuit of citizenship by their clients.283 One 
such client, Pablo, immigrated from the Dominican Republic and had been a lawful 
permanent resident since 1970.284 Pablo’s sisters, wife, children, and grandchildren 
are all U.S. citizens, and his three brothers are lawful permanent residents.285 He is 
a stable family man who supports himself by working in construction and 
maintenance.286 However, Pablo fears applying for naturalization because of two 
old criminal convictions: criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree from 
1982 and disorderly conduct from 1986.287 Despite forty years in the country, more 
than twenty-five since his last criminal conviction, and eligibility for naturalization, 
Pablo faces a considerable risk of being placed in removal proceedings should he 
apply for naturalization.288  
Judith Bernstein-Baker, executive director of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid 
Society and Council Migration Service of Philadelphia, has observed the same 
reticence in the immigrant community she serves. She wrote in a 2007 article that 
“[a]necdotally, we have met many individuals, including respectable professionals, 
whose problems in their youth prompted them to forego applying for naturalization 
because of the expanded grounds for deportation” and increased risk that the 
citizenship application process will turn instead into removal proceedings.289  
                                                                                                                 
 
 283. LAS Letter, supra note 211, at 10–11. 
 284. Id. at 11. 
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 288. See Brooks v. Holder, 621 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that N.Y. conviction for 
second-degree criminal possession of a weapon constitutes a crime of violence for 
immigration purposes). 
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By making the naturalization process fraught with risk, USCIS actively 
discourages eligible lawful residents from pursuing citizenship. Instead of having 
their adopted country formally recognize the social fact of their membership, they 
remain in the shadows. In the case of those lawful residents who came to the 
United States as children, or asylees and refugees who fled dangerous conditions, 
there is no other place to go that would be home. Each has little choice but to 
remain permanent nonmembers of the American community. 
In sum, various provisions of the INA offer relief from the severe consequence 
of removal for those with a criminal past. This reflects Congress’s intent to 
recognize rehabilitation and preserve family and community ties that immigrants 
develop. The waiver hearing ensures that those who are not sufficiently connected 
to the American community, or who are likely to reoffend, do not stay. This relief 
framework indicates a view of immigration administration as a necessarily flexible 
institution that pays close attention to individual circumstances when making 
membership decisions. Nevertheless, the same statute that offers relief denies a 
path to full membership. In addition, USCIS policies and practices effectively deny 
citizenship to those whose criminal conviction does not bar them from establishing 
their good moral character, both through misapplication of the law and by 
intimidating noncitizens from even applying. In the next Part, I show why this is 
problematic. 
III. THE FAILURES OF THE CURRENT REGIME 
The previous two Parts showed how the INA and USCIS deny naturalization to 
long-time permanent residents with a criminal past. This Part identifies three main 
failures with the current scheme. First, the current framework permanently 
relegates some residents to a subordinate, outsider status, frustrating the citizenship 
regime’s potential to promote social cohesion. Second, it denies access to a full set 
of equal rights to community members and thwarts the egalitarian and inclusive 
potential of American democracy. Third, by declaring individuals to be morally 
corrupt, it rejects the role of redemption in a just system of laws. These 
undemocratic, unproductive, and unforgiving failures create a permanent second-
class population of legal residents without justification.  
A. Social Integration and Cohesion 
The United States accepts more immigrants each year, from all over the world, 
than any other country.290 In 2009 alone, just under forty million individuals from 
190 different countries came to the United States.291 This tremendous inflow of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 290. See Top Ten Countries With the Largest Number of International Migrants, 
MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/charts/6.1.sht
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diverse people makes social cohesion a considerable challenge.292 The challenge is 
made even more daunting in a globally connected society where swift travel and 
widely available communication technology make it easy for individuals to come 
and go and retain all sorts of ties to their nation of origin.293 The challenge is not 
limited to integrating a steady flow of newcomers; it also requires promoting 
functioning communities that include a significant population of noncitizen 
residents.294 Current debates about birthright citizenship,295 Arizona’s Senate Bill 
1070,296 and the DREAM Act297 illustrate the considerable fracture between 
citizens and noncitizens.  
Many consider citizenship to be the finest form of societal integration, including 
state and federal governments, immigration advocates, and anti-immigration 
groups.298 This cohesive function carries great importance in immigrant-receiving 
countries like the United States. As political scientist Robert Putnam has shown, 
successful immigrant societies foster social solidarity and dampen the negative 
effects of diversity by constructing more encompassing identities.299 To accomplish 
this, he encourages identities that “enable previously separate ethnic groups to see 
themselves, in part, as members of a shared group with a shared identity.”300 This 
increases what Putnam calls “social capital,” which he defines as “social networks 
and the associated norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness.”301 Citizenship stands 
as just such a solidarity promoting shared identity. 
American citizenship has historically served as a tool of social cohesion from its 
inception following the creation of the republic. Today, to help meet the challenge 
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HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 623, 636 (2011). 
 298. Baker-Bernstein, supra note 289, at 367–69. 
 299. Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty First 
Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD., 137, 137–139 (2007). 
 300. Id. at 161. 
 301. Id. at 137. 
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of social cohesion, the congressionally created Office of Citizenship promotes 
naturalization and includes in the federal budget spending for immigrant integration 
programs.302 But as was shown in Part II, the current good moral character scheme 
denies citizenship to many lawful permanent residents. Rather than promote 
cohesion, an exclusionary membership policy with respect to individuals who 
permanently reside in the country and who participate daily in the community’s 
social and economic spheres serves only to subordinate and marginalize.303 Indeed, 
the cost of such a policy is community cohesion.304  
Denying citizenship to permanent residents prevents some immigrants from 
making a public choice about their membership or expressing their commitment to 
the state. Sociological studies suggest that exclusionary policies can result in a 
“boomerang” counter-assimilatory effect, causing immigrants who are excluded in 
some manner to increasingly perceive themselves as outsiders.305 This leads to self-
identification by national origin or as a member of a pan-ethnicity rather than as an 
“American” or “hyphenated American.”306 The failure of noncitizens to socially 
integrate then becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Their exclusion from 
membership produces a noninclusive identity and noninclusive behaviors.307 
This marginalization can trickle down to the children of the excluded. As they 
see how their noncitizen parents are treated, they may resist identifying as 
American and resist fully integrating themselves into their community.308 The 
authors of one study concluded that “the process of growing ethnic awareness 
among the children of immigrants . . . appear[ed] to be a function of their 
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 308. Rodriguez, supra note 63, at 1121 (“A child’s integration and social success depend 
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experiences, expectations, and perceptions of racial and ethnic 
discrimination . . . and their response to societal messages that tell them that they 
are not, and may never become, full-fledged members.”309 The fact that the great 
majority of the children who exhibited this effect were natural-born U.S. citizens 
illustrates the power of the exclusion.310  
Preventing community residents from attaining full membership also encourages 
citizens to view those individuals as strangers and outsiders instead of potential 
cocitizens. This diminishes the regard for immigrants generally and exacerbates 
distrust between citizen and noncitizen community residents,311 undermining social 
cohesion and a sense of shared enterprise.312 Because permanent noncitizens are 
not a constituency, the voting public and elected officials need not become aware of 
or address their needs and concerns in the process of setting community norms and 
defining the public good.313 When permanent residents have no realistic chance to 
unite their family in the United States,314 when they face permanently reduced 
benefit and employment opportunities,315 and when they are continually reminded, 
especially during election season, that their voice does not count, they tend not to 
integrate as fully as they would were they on the path to citizenship.316 
Some argue that exclusionary citizenship practices, while contrary to the 
foundational liberal democratic ideals of equality and welcome, nevertheless have 
provided an important source of cohesion in American society.317 That community 
cohesion justification falls away, however, when applied to the long-term residents 
at the center of this paper. Exclusion on character grounds can serve a cohesive 
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function when that exclusion keeps people physically out of the community. That 
is, refusing someone’s admission, physically segregating them (as in Indian 
reservations or World War II internment camps), or physically removing them from 
the country could promote social unity among those who remain.  
But excluding those like the Half Welcome, who had their removal waived by a 
judge and were granted lawful permanent resident status, and Kichul Lee, who was 
not deportable for his exuberant oyster picking, serves only to subordinate and 
marginalize. Recall that after being charged with removal for their crimes, the Half 
Welcome had a contested hearing before an immigration judge.318 At the hearing, 
evidence of reform and community ties was tested by cross-examination and 
weighed against evidence regarding the nature, recency, and seriousness of the 
offense. For each member of this group, including the Cambodian refugee 
discussed above who the BIA concluded “is a person who would be an asset to our 
society,”319 the applicant established not just her eligibility for relief, but that she 
merited the judge’s exercise of discretion in waiving removal. Nevertheless, the 
law declares them permanently unfit for membership.  
It is incoherent to decide that someone is a valuable and welcome part of the 
community and simultaneously proclaim that she cannot ever become a full 
member of the community. The waiver received by the Half Welcome is nothing 
other than a renewed admission to the community and provides a valid basis to 
presume that the immigrant currently possesses good moral character. Properly 
construed, the waiver is a membership decision. Since deportation is the “refusal by 
the Government to harbor persons whom it does not want,”320 the government’s 
decision to waive that sanction indicates that it does want that person. If she lacked 
good character, or posed a threat to the safety of the community, the waiver would 
have been denied and the person deported. That the waiver results in a grant of 
lawful permanent resident status, and not a temporary status, reinforces the 
conclusion that the government accepts the immigrant by the waiver. At the least, it 
should restart the clock for the probationary precitizenship residency period, after 
which the individual may apply for citizenship. 
Because the Half Welcome, the wrongfully denied, and those chilled from 
applying for naturalization are not physically excluded from the United States, the 
character bar to citizenship does no protective work with respect to the 
community.321 To the extent that supporters of the character bar are concerned 
about future crime and its threat to social cohesion, there is already in place a 
system to address law breaking: the criminal justice system. Criminal law and 
removal provisions, including relief from removal, address public-safety concerns 
with respect to noncitizens. Those who pose a serious threat are removed; those 
who do not, remain. If any person whose removal was waived commits future 
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crimes, she would receive appropriate treatment,322 including likely deportation.323 
As a result, membership law need not do the work of public safety.324 Instead, it 
should promote social cohesion by offering a path to full membership to all lawful 
permanent residents.  
B. Political Integration and Democracy 
Democratic theorists and the Supreme Court have frequently declared that the 
right to vote is “the essence of a democratic society”325 that “makes all other 
political rights significant.”326 Voting matters for many reasons. It is a means of 
expressing identity and influencing government policies; it is an inexpensive way 
of making a civic contribution; because each person’s vote counts the same as all 
the others, it is a symbol of equality; it gives voters a stake in the outcome and 
develops identification with the polity; it is evidence we live in a healthy 
democracy; and it confers legitimacy on the government and its policies.327  
In the United States, access to the ballot has long signified full membership in 
the polity. When the propertyless African American, and other racial minorities, 
and women citizens secured the franchise, they transformed from subjects to 
members.328 With each group of excluded residents welcomed to the voting fray, 
the United States moved closer to its founding promise of a robustly egalitarian 
democracy. While the United States has a long history of noncitizen voting, today it 
is all but extinct.329 Immigrants who seek full political rights must naturalize. 
Because of the vote’s fundamental importance, any rule or practice that denies 
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citizenship to permanent residents, and therefore denies them the franchise, 
deserves scrutiny.  
A major justification for the good character requirement relates to the political 
process.  It derives from the Aristotelian idea that self-governance only works when 
it is done by the virtuous.330 As Senator Mitch McConnell put it while discussing 
laws that disenfranchise felons, “states have a significant interest in reserving the 
vote for those who have abided by the social contract that forms the foundation of 
representative democracy . . . those who break our laws should not dilute the votes 
of law-abiding citizens.”331 According to this view, denying citizenship to 
permanent residents with criminal histories protects the integrity of American 
democracy. 
The political process rationale has some initial plausibility. To the extent that 
democracy truly works only when not subverted by fraud or force, it makes sense 
to demand that newly chosen citizens have a demonstrated commitment to 
respecting the rules of society. American democracy, however, is not Aristotelian. 
The United States is decidedly not ruled by the virtuous, nor is political 
participation contingent on excellence. In fact, the Voting Rights Act prohibits 
rules which require voters to possess good moral character.332  
Still, the government does limit the franchise based on criminal history. Today, 
every state but Maine and Vermont prohibit incarcerated felons from voting for 
some period of time.333 Felon disenfranchisement seeks to exclude those with a 
criminal past from full community membership by preventing them from choosing 
leaders and setting policy. Senator McConnell’s remark quoted above captures the 
essential justification for disenfranchising felons. Supporters believe that restricting 
access to citizenship protects the ballot from supposed undesirables.  
A growing literature, however, demonstrates that felon disenfranchisement does 
not serve any of the purposes that supporters claim it to have, nor does it 
meaningfully promote any traditional penological aim.334 Perhaps most 
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importantly, disenfranchisement frustrates successful reentry by making 
participating in and contributing to society more difficult.335 Numerous studies of 
disenfranchisement have documented the effect this has on the identity and 
behavior of the excluded.336 In the words of one disenfranchised citizen, who could 
just as easily have been a permanent resident non-citizen, “[N]ot being able to vote 
kind of says you don’t matter, and you’re not really a part of this community. But 
then here I am, your next-door neighbor.”337 Beyond affixing an outsider status, 
denying membership can also stigmatize the excluded.338 As Frederick Douglass 
put it, “[b]y depriving us of suffrage, you affirm our incapacity to form an 
intelligent judgment regarding public measures . . . . [T]o rule us out is to make us 
an exception, to brand us with the stigma of inferiority . . . .”339  
The good moral character bar to naturalization accomplishes the same as felon 
disenfranchisment: silencing the political voice of those who have committed 
crimes. Yet it suffers the same critique as felon disenfranchisement. Foreclosing 
access to full political rights frustrates social cohesion, and it does not sustain 
justification under any of the four classical justifications for punishment. A blanket 
bar to a good moral character finding based on a list of crimes that varies from the 
most serious to the petty is not proportional.340 Since the consequence of criminal 
behavior by noncitizens is increasingly deportation, a collateral bar to citizenship 
cannot be said (and most certainly has not been proven) to provide any additional 
deterrence to crime. The bar does not manage risk because the people are not 
physically excluded but continue to live and work in the community. It does, 
however, frustrate rehabilitation by labeling these individuals as incorrigible 
outsiders. 
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AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 159 (Philip S. Foner ed.,1975). 
 340. See Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683 (2009) 
(arguing for proportionate sanctions for immigration violations); Michael Wishnie, 
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1622 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:1571 
 
To the extent that the opponents of a path to citizenship for those with criminal 
convictions assert that a concern for the integrity of the political process justifies 
permanent exclusion from the citizenry, those concerns are already addressed in 
several ways. For those whom I call the Half Welcome, a judge has concluded that 
they are rehabilitated and pose no threat to the community, and that they have 
significant ties within and to the United States. Their permanent political exclusion 
cannot be justified on character grounds after the waiver grant. In fact, to the extent 
that felon disenfranchisement laws operate, they serve the function of protecting the 
political process.341 As is the case with public safety, naturalization law need not do 
that work.  
Besides serving no productive or legitimate aim, using the character requirement 
to deny citizenship to permanent residents violates the consent principle of 
democracy.342 It forecloses the ability of residents to fully and equally participate in 
the political arena.343 While there are limits on the consent principle,344 policy 
decisions are deformed when those who are governed cannot assert and protect 
their interests. Those without the possibility of future membership “experience the 
state as a pervasive and frightening power that shapes their lives and regulates their 
every move—and never asks for their opinion.”345 Indeed, the lack of the franchise 
is the very reason that the Supreme Court considers noncitizens a “‘discrete and 
insular’ minority” deserving of heightened judicial protection.346 The recent surge 
in anti-immigrant legislation demonstrates the relative ease of discriminating 
against noncitizens (at least until courts intervene).347 Assuring a path to 
membership for all lawful permanent residents would make it more difficult to 
enact and sustain unequal or derogatory treatment.  
The good moral character bar does more than deny certain lawful permanent 
residents the opportunity to exercise the most powerful political right. Permanently 
barring them from naturalization forecloses other opportunities for civic 
engagement. An example from Lewiston, Maine illustrates this point. In 2001, 
Somali refugees that the U.S. government had resettled in urban areas across the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 341. Spiro, supra note 13, at 516 (“[T]here are mechanisms other than naturalization 
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country decided to collectively resettle in the small town.348 By 2007 some 3,000 
Somalis had come to Lewiston, comprising approximately 10%of the city’s 
population.349 
In May 2007, Lewiston Mayor Laurent Gilbert and several members of the 
town’s City Council sought to change the membership requirement for 
participation on the Downtown Neighborhood Task Force from “registered voter” 
to “resident” of Lewiston.350 Supporters explained that it would allow for “a larger 
cross section of folks to serve on the committee” and noted the hypocrisy of city 
officials who publicly stated that new immigrants should get more involved in 
community affairs while denying them a voice on the Task Force by limiting its 
membership to citizens.351 Given the significant Somali population in Lewiston, 
Mayor Gilbert felt it important to have a Somali on the Task Force and supported 
the change.352 He advocated for the appointment of Ismail Ahmed, a six-year legal 
resident who was in the process of gaining U.S. citizenship.353 Several opposed the 
mayor’s proposal.354 One resident, perhaps unaware that noncitizens cannot vote in 
any Maine election, declared that immigrants should care enough to be registered 
voters if they sought to get involved in community affairs.355 The proposal 
failed.356 Despite his willingness and desire to participate in local affairs, Ismail 
Ahmed’s lack of citizenship prevented his full civic engagement.357 
As with social cohesion, the political process rationale does not provide a 
convincing justification for the good moral character bar to naturalization. Using 
criminal records as a proxy for virtue and a character test as a precondition for 
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access to the franchise does not promote or protect democracy. This is especially so 
when the blunt instrument of immigration law’s “aggravated felony” provision 
does the decisive work.358 To the contrary, excluding a portion of permanent 
residents from full political rights diminishes democracy.  
C. Redemption 
In his 2004 State of the Union address, President Bush declared America to be 
“the land of second chance” and urged that a criminal past should not restrict the 
opportunities for any individual after she has completed her sentence.359 The 
principle of redemption—that an individual can be released from bearing the mark 
of past misdeeds—has long played a role in the American legal system. Bankruptcy 
law and executive pardons, around since the founding, reflect a tradition of 
forgiving offenses or debts.360 The prominence of redemption in the law arguably 
peaked during the rehabilitative-focused “penal welfare” reform efforts of the mid-
twentieth century, which preached rehabilitative interventions over retributive 
punishments.361 At no other time did American policy demonstrate such a 
commitment to the idea that a criminal act did not define the character of the person 
who committed it. 
Since the 1950s, however, America has largely turned away from redemption, 
replacing it with an increasing emphasis on punishment and condemnation. As 
David Garland and others have shown, retributive punishment is marked by 
“reactive sanctioning of criminal individuals” that prefers uniform penalties that are 
mechanically dispensed.362 Although individuals view themselves as capable of 
change, they see people with criminal histories as having “immutabl[y] and 
essential[ly] flawed natures.”363 The new, but now ubiquitous, sex offender 
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registries, the near extinction of the pardon, and the continued mass incarceration 
despite falling crime rates exemplify the prevailing preference for punitive 
justice.364 
As with any other institution or regime, citizenship rules reflect the trends and 
values of the society that enact them. Not surprisingly, then, the story of 
redemption in immigration law looks much the same.  As discussed in Part I, the 
touchstone of the good moral character inquiry for naturalization applicants was 
long the person’s present good moral character. The Attorney General declared in 
1943 that the “‘American sense of justice and fair play’ [should] 
‘respect . . . rehabilitation and not . . . brand and treat [the noncitizen] as a criminal 
perpetually.’”365 The emergence of relief from removal reflected the belief that, 
despite noncitizens’ past transgressions, they can still be an integral and integrated 
part of American society. Similarly, until 1990, a criminal judge could make a 
binding judicial recommendation against deportation (JRAD), based on the 
immigrant’s ties to the United States and unlikelihood of recidivism, that precluded 
deportation based on a criminal conviction.366  
In the last few decades, however, punitive justice notions have infected 
immigration law.367 The elimination of the JRAD in 1990, and the strident 
opposition to anything that resembles an amnesty for undocumented immigrants, 
reflects the popularity of a punitive view toward noncitizens who violate the law. 
The 1996 federal legislation discussed above,368 and subsequent laws that further 
increased the immigration consequences of criminal behavior and made those 
consequences much more likely,369 also demonstrate the turn to a more punitive, 
and increasingly draconian, scheme. By concomitantly decreasing opportunities for 
relief and individual review, and extending those consequences into the citizenship 
realm through the “aggravated felony” good moral character bar, these changes 
have entrenched retribution in immigration law.   
Recent U.S. Supreme Court cases and criminological research suggests a turning 
tide, outlining the appropriateness and necessity of a redemptive legal framework. 
In a pair of recent cases involving juveniles, the Supreme Court has made it clear 
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that the Constitution does not allow us to permanently give up on people who 
commit crimes at a young age. In Roper v. Simmons, the Court held 
unconstitutional the imposition of capital punishment for crimes committed by 
someone under the age of eighteen.370 As compared to adults, the Court found that 
juveniles have a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility” 
and their characters are “not as well formed.”371 This made it difficult for expert 
psychologists to “differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects irreparable corruption.”372 Because juveniles are more capable of change 
than are adults, and their actions less likely to be evidence of “irretrievably 
depraved character[,]” the Court found it more likely that any character deficiencies 
evidenced by crime will be reformed.373  
Drawing on its reasoning in Roper, the Supreme Court outlawed life without 
parole sentences for individuals who committed crimes other than homicide under 
the age of eighteen in Graham v. Florida.374 As the Court explained, life without 
parole “means denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character 
improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in store 
for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of his 
days.”375 In short, it “requires the sentencer to make a judgment that the juvenile is 
incorrigible.”376 Finding incorrigibility to be “inconsistent with youth,” the Court 
again outlawed a penalty that “forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal . . . [and] 
makes an irrevocable judgment about that person’s value and place in society.”377  
The Court held that individuals must be given an opportunity to show, at some 
point in the future, that they have matured enough while in prison that they are fit 
to rejoin society. 
In Roper and Graham, the Supreme Court disallowed conclusive character 
judgments based on an act committed while young. Because the “aggravated 
felony” bar to a good moral character finding does not take age at offense into 
consideration, Roper and Graham cast doubt on the legitimacy of a permanent 
character bar for those who committed crimes under the age of eighteen.  That 
some noncitizens who committed crimes before they turned eighteen first arrived in 
the United States when they were much younger only reinforces the point.378 The 
permanent character bar is also suspect because it denies immigrants with a 
criminal past a chance to demonstrate their reform and current fitness for full 
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membership.  As New York’s Governor Paterson declared, and President Bush 
implied,379 inflexible laws that do not credit rehabilitation are “adverse to the 
values that our country represents.”380 
It is not just Supreme Court holdings rejecting fixed character judgments that 
support a place for redemption in membership law. Criminological and sociological 
findings regarding reentry and recidivism demonstrate the necessity and 
appropriateness of a redemptive scheme. It is undisputed that most recidivism 
occurs within three years of release, and most offenders die or desist from crime by 
age seventy.381 In fact, over 80% of people stop committing crimes by the age of 
twenty-eight.382 Many criminologists argue that this “age-crime curve” has been 
“virtually unchanged for about 150 years.”383 The evidence of desistance at 
relatively early ages rebuts the notion that criminal deviance is something 
permanent. Instead, it is most often short lived. The data strongly militate against 
life-long sanctions for criminal behavior and call for policies that allow for and 
recognize reform.  
More recent research adds nuance and strength to these findings. Working from 
the premise that recidivism declines steadily with time, researchers have sought to 
compare the risks of rearrest for those with a prior contact with the criminal justice 
system to the risk of arrest for two cohorts: (1) all same-aged individuals from the 
general population and (2) same-aged individuals with a clean criminal record. 
They have sought to identify empirically a point in time when a person with a 
criminal record, who remained free of further contact with the criminal justice 
system, has no measurably greater risk of rearrest than either of the two cohorts.384 
Employing a statistical concept called the “hazard rate”, these studies have 
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consistently found that individuals with a prior contact who stay arrest-free for 
seven years or more pose very little risk of future crime.385 Moreover, that low risk 
converges with the risk of a same-aged individual from the general population at 
around seven years after contact, and approaches (though never equals) that of 
same-aged individuals with a clean criminal record.386 These researchers have 
concluded from these findings that lifetime bans for ex-felons linked to prior 
crimes, such as those related to employment eligibility, are not consistent with the 
data on desistance and cannot be justified on the basis of safety or concerns about 
crime risk.387 Instead, they assert that where such bars exist, the laws should 
include sunset clauses for individuals who stay straight for a certain period of 
time.388  
The permanent good moral character bar that makes naturalization impossible 
for some immigrants is precisely the kind of lifetime bar that this data challenges. 
Because a person’s criminal record empirically becomes stale enough that it largely 
ceases to provide any useful information relevant to assessing risk (presuming she 
avoids further contact with the criminal justice system), naturalization law should 
not impose lifetime bars to membership based on prior criminal behavior. Not only 
is the presumption behind the bar not borne out, the badge the bar imposes may 
contribute to a sense of hopelessness and frustrate reform.389 In contrast, a policy 
that offered redemptive citizenship could provide additional incentive for 
immigrants to adopt prosocial, integrative attitudes. 
A just naturalization scheme cannot reject redemption. Not only does a punitive 
framework cause the negative consequences outlined above, it refuses the positive 
                                                                                                                 
 
 385. The hazard rate is defined as the probability per time unit that a case that has 
survived to the beginning of the respective interval will fail in that interval. See, e.g., 
Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 384.  
 386. See id. at 338–44 (finding that after four to nine years, a person with a single prior 
record of aggravated assault, burglary, or robbery, who subsequently stayed clean has the 
same risk of reoffending as members of the general population of the same age, and the risk 
compared to those who had never been arrested becomes close enough to be largely 
irrelevant after anywhere between seven and twenty-five years, depending on the risk 
tolerance one is willing to accept); Soothill & Francis, supra note 384, at 373 (finding that 
after a ten-year conviction-free period, prior contact is no longer informative for future 
criminality and the risk of reconviction of those with a finding of guilt as a juvenile or before 
age twenty-one converges with non-offenders between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, or 
approximately ten to fifteen years after the initial conviction); Kurlychek et al., Enduring 
Risk, supra note 384, at 80 (“[I]f a person with a criminal record remains crime free for a 
period of about 7 years, his or her risk of a new offense is similar to that of a person without 
any criminal record.”); Kurlychek et al., Scarlet Letters and Recidivism, supra note 384, at 
1117 (after five to seven years of law-abiding conduct, “the risk of a new criminal event 
among a population of nonoffenders and a population of prior offenders becomes similar”). 
 387. Bushway & Sweeten, supra note 381, at 702 (urging sunset clauses after seven to 
ten years of no criminal justice contact).  
 388. Id. 
 389. Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 253, 254 (2002) (describing how collateral 
consequences impact employment and frustrate the ability “to lead law-abiding lives, to 
complete probation, or to avoid recidivism”). 
2012] GOOD MORAL CHARACTER REQUIREMENT 1629 
 
effects of a legal regime that recognizes individuality and change. As numerous 
scholars have shown, the possibility of redemption can be a powerful incentive for 
individuals to expend the effort needed to achieve rehabilitation.390 If America is to 
be the land of second chance,391 it must not be so only for citizens. It should restore 
a meaningful place for redemption in membership law. To promote a robust, 
egalitarian democracy and to foster a cohesive community, that second chance must 
offer the opportunity of citizenship to all permanent residents, even those with a 
criminal past. 
A path to citizenship for all permanent residents encourages their investment in 
the community while discouraging citizens from marginalizing future fellow 
citizens. While naturalization is not an end point in the process of integration into 
the American community, it provides an individual with important rights, such as 
the vote and security against deportation, that make full participation possible. 
Indeed, full, secure social integration is impossible without citizenship. When we 
deny legal permanent residents a path to citizenship, we “limit[] the potential of 
U.S. citizenship to be a viable context for a sense of belonging, and for 
participat[ing] in civic, political, social, and economic life that is inclusive and 
ultimately respectful of all individuals.”392 In a liberal democracy, no permanent 
residents should be relegated indefinitely to second-class status. To better meet the 
challenge of a pluralistic, globally-connected populace, our naturalization laws 
must allow and encourage all legal permanent residents the opportunity to become 
full members.  
IV. REFORMS 
According to Professor Hiroshi Motomura, the long-standing view of 
immigration in America was one that saw immigrants as potential future citizens.393 
This approach promoted a participatory democracy and incentivized social 
cohesion by encouraging immigrants to commit to, and participate in, their 
community. It simultaneously encouraged the citizenry to view these residents as 
future members. While modifications today are necessary to incorporate the variety 
of temporary stays permitted by limited-duration visas, there is no compelling 
reason to treat lawful permanent residents as anything but potential American 
citizens. Some may choose not to pursue citizenship, but the primary purpose of the 
status is as a path to citizenship. When permanent residents are denied the 
opportunity to naturalize, they are less likely to identify with America and fully 
invest in its economic, social, political, and cultural arenas.  
This Part proposes two complimentary solutions to the problematic practice of 
denying an opportunity for full membership to those with a criminal past. First, it 
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urges Congress to eliminate the good moral character requirement entirely, or 
restrict the good moral character bar triggered by criminal conduct. Should a 
character requirement be kept, it recommends changes that USCIS should 
implement to realign the Agency’s actions with its mission and to assure fair and 
lawful character assessments. 
A. Reform the INA: Eliminate or Restrict the Good Moral Character Requirement 
Administrative law scholars and those who write about immigration and 
naturalization frequently criticize the way that immigration bureaucrats exercise the 
considerable discretion afforded to them.394 Given the way that USCIS is 
approaching good moral character decisions, the best way to ensure fairness might 
be to limit agency discretion. This can be most readily accomplished in two ways: 
(1) by eliminating the good moral character requirement entirely; or (2) by 
imposing a bright line rule stating that certain crimes denote a lack of good moral 
character. 
First and foremost, a person’s character should have no bearing on their 
membership in their political community of residence. While most scholars and 
theorists have long accepted that naturalization is a democratic process for 
determining membership, and that the distribution of membership is a political 
matter of which the state has sovereign power,395 there is an emerging literature, of 
which my Article is a part, discussing a right of access to membership.396 Under 
this rights-based norm, what matters for membership in the political community of 
residence is residence in the political community. Anything else—such as civic 
knowledge or language ability—should not bar membership to someone who has 
established (and been granted) permanent residence in the political community. 
This right of access norm can be seen emerging, for example, as racial, ethnic, and 
gender barriers to citizenship are coming under increasing stress, and as states relax 
their rules against dual nationality.397 
A second reason to eliminate the good moral character requirement is that it is 
superfluous. As Part III showed, the character requirement is superfluous because 
of strict deportation provisions, limited relief granted only to those few who 
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demonstrate reform and community ties, and widespread felon disenfranchisement. 
Its elimination from naturalization law, therefore, would not impact any of the 
goals of keeping the public safe or protecting the integrity of American democracy.  
Furthermore, eliminating the character requirement would also avoid the 
problematic and largely unreviewable exercise of discretion by agency bureaucrats, 
as exemplified by Kichul Lee and the hundreds of individuals who joined him as 
plaintiffs in a class action suit against USCIS regarding discretionary 
character-based denials.398 
An additional reason to eliminate the good moral character requirement for 
citizenship is that a character inquiry itself is problematic, if not folly.399 Character 
does not admit of an easy definition. It is something internal which cannot be 
observed or verified. Determining character necessarily requires an assessment of 
imperfect stand-ins, such as behavior and reputation, but these alone or together do 
not amount to character.400  
As Chief Judge Learned Hand described the judge’s task,  
We must own that the statute imposes upon courts a task impossible of 
assured execution; people differ as much about moral conduct as they 
do about beauty . . . . Left at large as we are, without means of 
verifying our conclusion, . . . the outcome must needs be tentative; and 
not much is gained by discussion.401  
In another character case, Judge Hand confessed that the decision was made by 
“resort to our own conjecture, fallible as we recognize it to be.”402 Professor Martin 
Shapiro observed that “more than anything else[, Judge Hand’s] opinions seem to 
be pleas to Congress to get him out of the morals business.”403  
The aggravated felony bar could be said to be an answer to that plea. It functions 
as a bright-line rule that constrains agency discretion. But Congress has imposed 
too bright a line. The fact that conduct as varied as murder, drug possession, 
writing a bad check, and misdemeanor shoplifting can come under the definition of 
“aggravated felony,” and thus equally and permanently bar someone from 
demonstrating good character, speaks to the senselessness of the current 
                                                                                                                 
 
 398. See Portillo-Rendon v. Holder, 662 F.3d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 2011) (declining to 
review good moral character determination in the context of relief from removal because it 
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framework. The “aggravated felony” bar to a good moral character finding captures 
too many crimes which do not indicate a lack of character, and it endures too long 
even for more serious crimes. Moreover, some crimes that trigger a character bar 
reflect the grim economic circumstances or immaturity of the individual more than 
they indicate an irretrievably depraved character, but decision makers are not free 
to consider such factors where the statutory bar applies.404  
Even when the character decision is constrained by bright-line rules, 
legislatively judging the character of others and discerning their worthiness cannot 
be anything but arbitrary and capricious. It substitutes a behavior determination for 
a character assessment,405 and ignores the variety of factors that surround any 
single act—such as environment and intention, reformation and repentance—that 
speak to the character of the actor. For discretionary good moral character 
assessments, now conducted by low-level bureaucratic staffers who are not 
required to be lawyers,406 psychiatrists, or counselors, much less divine beings, the 
determination is little more than wild guessing. It certainly is not informed by 
psychological training or knowledge of desistance data. 
Assuming that there is some value and legitimacy to a moral character 
requirement and some truth to its presumptions (that we can comfortably assess a 
person’s character or predict a person’s future behavior), and presuming the good 
moral character requirement’s survival,407 the INA should nevertheless allow 
permanent residents with a criminal past the opportunity to demonstrate their 
current fitness for full membership.408 In the “land of the second chance,” a 
criminal conviction should not be a permanent bar to a good character finding.409 
The reasons have already been discussed above: the Supreme Court has rejected 
fixed character judgments based on youthful crime and desistance studies 
demonstrate that past criminal history becomes insignificant as a predictor of future 
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conduct in a short number of years.410 Just as most felon disenfranchisement laws 
wear off with time,411 redeeming the ex-offender’s political rights, so too should 
laws regarding criminal convictions and eligibility for citizenship.  
As before, the Half Welcome bring the shortcomings of the current provision 
into sharp focus. Properly conceived, the waiver of deportation is a new decision to 
admit the individual to the community. It is not just the fact of that decision, but its 
basis, that underscores the injustice of denying the Half Welcome an opportunity to 
become full members. The waiver was not based on the immigrant’s special or 
needed skills in the labor force, but on her demonstrated ties to the community and 
evidence of reform.412 As such, the decision to readmit the immigrant is truly about 
the emerging affiliated identity with, and integration into, America, not the 
immigrant’s functional contribution to the community. Following a renewed 
probationary period, justice requires that they have an opportunity to demonstrate 
their fitness for full membership in the community, based on their behavior during 
that probationary period. 
Legislative reform is not necessary only for the Half Welcome. For all those 
who live in the shadows of membership, whether wrongly denied or chilled from 
applying, the citizenship consequences of past criminal conduct should wear off 
with time. The permanent bar triggered by “aggravated felonies” should be 
replaced with a seven-year bar, to ensure that sufficient time passes after the 
conviction to conclude that the applicant has reformed. A clean record would not 
guarantee a good moral character finding, but it should be strong evidence in that 
regard. This accords with the historical purpose of legal permanent resident status 
as probationary period and aligns the character requirement with the desistance 
literature discussed in Part II above.413 In addition, the seven-year period, as 
opposed to the regular five-year residency period required for most citizenship 
applicants, would account for the prior crime by requiring a longer period of lawful 
behavior. 
Such legislative reform would not be unprecedented. A similar proposal was 
made in 2006. That year, an immigration reform bill proposed making the good 
moral character bar triggered by an “aggravated felony” inapplicable to those who 
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had completed their term of imprisonment or sentence ten years prior to applying 
for naturalization.414 That bill passed the Senate, but was never enacted into law.415 
The United Kingdom offers a model for a naturalization scheme that redeems 
individuals from the burden of prior crimes. Under the Rehabilitation of Offenders 
Act of 1974, criminal convictions can become “spent” or ignored after a specified 
rehabilitation period.416 All convictions for which the sentence was less than thirty 
months can become “spent.”417 The length of the rehabilitation period depends on 
the sentence given and the age at the time of conviction. After the rehabilitation 
period, an individual is not obliged to mention the “spent” conviction when, among 
other things, applying for naturalization.418 As such, those with prior convictions 
are, after a period of three to ten years of crime-free residence in the United 
Kingdom, freed from the burden of past mistakes and can naturalize. 
Assuming a character requirement is kept, the number of crimes that prevent a 
good moral character finding should be reduced, and the duration of any character 
bar should be limited. This will ensure that only those who have committed the 
most serious crimes that reflect a lack of moral character will be denied 
naturalization on character grounds; it will ensure that the executive agency will not 
misuse any discretion to deny applicants on character grounds as it has done in 
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cases like that of Kichul Lee; and it will restore the redemptive view that Congress 
and the Courts had long inserted into the good moral character requirement. 
B. Reforms at USCIS 
In fixing specific periods during which good moral character must be shown, 
Congress clearly intended to make citizenship available to individuals who, despite 
previous transgressions, currently are of good moral character.419 Yet USCIS 
currently uses the good moral character requirement to prevent many with minor 
criminal histories from becoming citizens. This contradicts the statutory scheme 
and USCIS’s mission and produces negative effects. This Section suggests several 
changes to USCIS practices, including better training, revising the Adjudicator’s 
Field Manual and N-400 form, and retracting the Aytes Memo’s directives about 
referring naturalization applicants with criminal history to ICE. 
As the Kichul Lee v. Gonzalez420 class action demonstrated, USCIS needs to 
better train ISOs and supervisors on how to make proper character assessments for 
naturalization purposes.421 The deposition of ISO Eladio Torres shows that the 
problem was not isolated in Washington state, and that it persists. The law is clear: 
an “aggravated felony” conviction only bars a good moral character finding if it 
occurred after November 29, 1990;422 pre-residence period conduct cannot form the 
exclusive basis for a denial of good moral character;423 and discretionary good 
moral character assessments must be made by considering both negative and 
positive equities.424 Training must clarify this so that ISOs do not continue to apply 
an incorrect standard. 
Revisions to the AFM’s chapter on good moral character are necessary as well. 
As of now, the manual describes a one-sided inquiry, with USCIS singularly 
focused on collecting negative evidence regarding the applicant.425 The government 
gets rap sheets and conducts an extensive background check on the applicants.426 
Those with criminal records receive a “Case File Review Notice” instructing them 
to provide original arrest records and dispositions for all criminal contacts.427 And 
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ISOs are instructed to ask crime-related questions in a dozen ways.428 Even though 
the applicant bears the burden of establishing her eligibility, and USCIS is right to 
protect itself against fraud by conducting its own investigation, naturalization 
proceedings are not adversarial. The AFM should suggest to ISOs that they ask 
applicants with a criminal past to submit character evidence, and explain what such 
evidence might be. Similarly, the “Case File Review Notice” and N-400 
Naturalization Application Form could easily advise applicants that they may 
submit evidence that would prove that they are, and have been for the past five 
years, a person of good moral character. USCIS materials should also indicate that 
a lack of negative information during statutory period reflects positively on the 
applicant’s character. As federal courts have declared, evidence of no further 
arrests or convictions is “at least probative of . . . rehabilitation.”429 
USCIS should also retract the Aytes Memo. Rather than refer those with 
criminal contacts for potential removal and hold naturalization applications in 
abeyance, the better course would be for USCIS to fully adjudicate each 
naturalization application. If denied, USCIS could refer the case to ICE for review 
by agency lawyers to determine if removal charges could and should be filed. 
Given that naturalization applicants are likely to be stable residents with citizen or 
lawful permanent resident family members, they pose little risk of flight, and thus 
there is no need to immediately detain them pending ICE review.  
The Aytes Memo is also wrong to give USCIS adjudicators the authority to 
issue NTAs or refer naturalization applicants to ICE for several reasons. First, it 
directs field offices to treat a naturalization application as denied when USCIS 
issues a Notice to Appear for the applicant.430 This creates a perverse and appealing 
incentive for ISOs to clear naturalization backlogs and keep their decision-time 
average low.431 Second, as demonstrated above, ISOs make erroneous good moral 
character decisions, either out of ignorance about the actual governing law or out of 
a good-faith mistaken interpretation of the law. What constitutes an “aggravated 
felony” is ever changing, and is often a difficult puzzle for even immigration and 
federal judges to untangle. Finally, because INA § 318 bars adjudication of 
naturalization applications when removal proceedings are pending, the issuance of 
a NTA denies applicants the opportunity to appeal improper denials, leaving errors 
uncorrected. For those applicants who were eligible to naturalize, their only 
recourse is to win their removal proceeding in immigration court and then reapply 
(and pay the naturalization fee again)432 and hope that the error is not repeated. At 
the same time, other ISOs do not learn from the mistakes of their colleagues and 
will unnecessarily continue to make similar errors. 
Together, these modest reforms would eliminate wrongful denials on character 
grounds, eliminate inefficiencies, and reduce the chilling effect that current 
practices have on those individuals who are eligible for naturalization but 
nevertheless refrain from applying.  
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The INA should not per se bar citizenship to permanent residents with criminal 
histories, nor should USCIS intimidate eligible applicants from applying and get 
the law wrong when they do. Instead of preventing political participation in local 
communities and marginalizing the noncitizen community, the naturalization 
framework should encourage economic, social, and political investment in 
American communities.433 Inclusion and participation are self-reinforcing. Feeling 
included encourages you to participate, and participating makes you more included. 
Therefore, the good moral character bar to a finding of good moral character should 
be eliminated or fitted with a seven-year sunset clause.  
CONCLUSION 
Congress calls United States citizenship “the most valued governmental benefit 
of this land.”434 It ensures secure, robust political participation. Many consider it 
the finest form of societal integration, including state and federal governments, 
immigration advocates, and anti-immigration groups. Nevertheless, citizenship is 
becoming more difficult to obtain, particularly for those with a criminal past. The 
expressively punitive nature of the INA’s current good moral character provision 
and USCIS’s misguided priorities and unlawful practices in handling naturalization 
applications are forcing legal residents with a criminal past to permanently live in 
the shadows of full membership. This fractures the community that the citizenship 
regime aims to promote and undermines American democracy.  
There is undeniable merit to ensuring that the United States does not welcome to 
full membership those who repeatedly flaunt society’s rules and who pose a risk to 
the community’s safety. Still, there must be a rational justification for pinning such 
consequential importance to any and every act of wrongdoing. No such justification 
exists for the current character requirement and the way it is being applied by 
USCIS. Rather than excluding and subordinating community members, we must 
look for ways to restore the view of all lawful permanent residents as future 
citizens where possible. Eliminating the good moral character bar or restricting it 
temporally, and making USCIS implement the laws correctly and fairly, would do 
just that. 
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